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Until very recently, States have paid little attention to the
control of pollution originatingon land which threatensthe
high seas. However, in the past few years the international
community has taken the first tentative steps toward an internationalorderfor the control of land-basedhigh seas pollution. This Article examines the foundations in customary
internationallaw for these steps. In particular,it reviews
evidence of State practicein analogousareasof international
law, the protests of States, treaties, judicial decisions, activities of the United Nations, declarationsof international
bodies and published commentary to determine whether existing customary internationallaw norms are applicable to
the pollution of the high seas from land-basedsources.
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

The purpose of this Article is to explore existing legal sources to
determine whether customary international law applies to landbased pollution of the high seas. The concern here is not with the
substance of any lex specialis between-particular States but rather
with a broader survey of customary international law. Is there any
norm of customary international law prohibiting land-based pollution of the high seas which an international tribunal or the International Court could apply if this legal question came before it? Or is
there a legal vacuum? Assuming that legal control of land-based
pollution of the high seas by its nature is better effectuated by
preventive measures taken through inter-State cooperation rather
* This Article is based upon one chapter of the author's doctoral thesis in
international law, Jesus College, University of Cambridge.
** Practicing attorney, Washington, D.C. B.S., University of Florida, 1966;
J.D., University of Georgia, 1970; Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 1977.

than by post-delictual assignments of responsibility through the judicial process, perhaps it is more appropriate to ask if there is any
customary international law which would oblige States to undertake
land-based pollution control on their own by suitable non-adversary
means.
While it may be true that customary international law rarely provides detailed mechanisms or standards necessary for the precise
regulation of the rights and duties of States in a given area of international law, its importance should not be underestimated. If customary international law does postulate an obligation not to pollute
the high seas from land-based sources, then it follows that States
would have on the one hand the duty among themselves to develop
the necessary competence and machinery to implement fundamental
legal norms and on the other hand the correlative right to a pollution-free high seas. Thus, customary international law, if it may be
said to exist, both points out the general norms which States should
follow and provides a legal right for States to protect and preserve
the high seas from land-based pollution.
To write of land-based pollution of the high seas is to address a
relatively new topic. Only in the last decade or so have we realized
that our activities may threaten the environment, and the body of
hard scientific information on the subject is only now being formed.
Accumulation of information on effects that our activities have on
the marine environment is particularly troublesome, given the great
size of the world's oceans and our relative ignorance about what
takes place in and under the sea. This is especially true of the high
seas, the largest ocean area, located far from land and under no one's
jurisdiction.
The initial study of marine environmental harm has tended to
track recognition of the first signs of this harm. These signs become
manifest more readily near the coast and in smaller, enclosed or
semi-enclosed ocean areas surrounded by industrialized States
which are dependent on the sea's resources and which have a stake in
preserving and protecting their present and future use of the sea.
There are strong indications, however, that much of the land-based
waste deposited in the coastal sea margins has potentially adverse
implications for the high seas, both as a result of damage done to the
coastal seas and because some of that waste is carried by the tides
and currents to the high seas. In addition, much land-based waste
bypasses coastal areas and is deposited in the high seas either directly by pipeline and dumping from ships or indirectly through the
atmosphere.
As States act to preserve and protect their land and adjacent sea
territory from pollution, they will understandably look increasingly
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to the high seas as a repository for land-based waste. And as the
resource base of the high seas inevitably expands, many of the same
conflicts which presently exist between the use of coastal margins as
a waste receptacle and exploitation of coastal margin resources will
arise also in the high seas.
Definition of Land-BasedPollution of the High Seas
Land-based pollution of the high seas is a component of marine
pollution. It has been widely defined by the international community
as follows:
The introduction by men, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, resulting in
such deleterious effects as: harm to living resources, hazard to human
health, hindrance to marine activity including fishing, impairment of
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.'

This definition places two important limitations on all marine
pollution, including land-based pollution of the high seas. First,
marine pollution is limited to the activities of mankind. The qualifying phrase, "[t]he introduction by men," excludes from the definition
"pollution" emanating from natural causes no matter how harmful it
may be to the marine environment. Examples of nonhuman marine
pollution are the constant natural seepage of oil and other minerals
from land, above and below sea level, into the oceans, and foreign
chemicals like sulphur and other materials introduced into the sea by
irregular phenomena such as volcanoes and earthquakes. A primary
reason for their exclusion from marine pollution is that these natural
events are presently beyond human control. However, "natural pollution" cannot be ignored as it must be taken into account when estimating what the ocean can realistically absorb from human pollution.
Second, marine pollution does not include all matter introduced to
the sea by mankind. To qualify as marine pollution, substances discharged must have a "deleterious effect" on the marine environment
1. This definition was adopted by the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment held in 1972, Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972); it was
subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, G.A. Res.
2994-3004, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 42-48, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); and it
has also been used by the Paris, Helsinki and Barcelona Conventions, discussed
in text accompanying notes 111-30 infra.This definition was also adopted by the
Sixth Session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference held in New
York, May 23-July 15, 1977, in its July 15, 1977, Informal Composite Negotiating
Text, A/Conf. 62fWP. 10, art. 1(4). It should be noted that the Text refined the

definition by including as marine pollution substances or energy "which results
or is likely to result" in deleterious effects. Id. (emphasis added).

(several examples of which are referred to in the definition quoted
above). 2 This important qualification implies that the marine environment may be legitimately used as a receptacle for our nondeleterious land-based waste from all sources in recognition that waste
disposal is a necessary consequence of our existence. In many instances disposal of waste into the marine environment produces little
or no consequential damage, and in certain situations it may even
result in some benefit.3 Thus, it follows that the introduction of waste
into the marine
environment which causes no material damage is
4
lawful per se.
Marine pollution results from both land-based and oceanbased activities. The latter derives from operational vessel discharges
and all resource exploitation carried out in or on the ocean floor. The
former encompasses all our land-based activities having a deleterious effect on the sea. Some land-based pollution, for example, is
carried into the air and washed out in rain either over neighboring
seas or over land and then carried to sea after run-off into rivers or
coastal waters. Some of it is discharged through sewer outfalls into
coastal waters. Some is dumped from ships and some reaches the sea
through rivers. Land-based pollutants are usually to be found in oil
waste, domestic, municipal and agricultural waste, industrial waste
and thermal waste.
The final resting place of many of these land-based marine pollutants is the high seas, which are defined simply as "all parts of the sea
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
States."5 The high seas have also been referred to as "the open sea
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of no one nation." 6 It should be noted that this
definition could be affected by the emerging concept of a "patrimonial sea," presently the subject of debate at the continuing Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. If adopted it
2. Thus, throughout this Article reference to "land-based pollution" means
only waste causing demonstrable real or prospective material damage.
3. For example, thermal waste from an electric power station situated on the
south English coast has enabled a new species of clam to establish itself for the
first time in British waters. ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION,
THIRD REPORT: POLLUTION IN SOME BRITISH ESTUARIES AND COASTAL WATERS

107

(Annex A 1972).
4. It is conceivable that a State might assert a marine pollution claim against
another State based on moral injury for violation of its territorial integrity by
the mere act of waste disposal (as opposed to pollution). Here there might be
some question as to whether proof of material damage is a necessary element of
"legal injury." See Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of TransnationalPollutioi, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975).
5. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
6. 1 A. SHALOWiTZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 300 (1962).
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would consist roughly of a belt of sea and seabed up to 200 miles in
width lying seaward and adjacent to the territorial sea over which
the littoral State would have exclusive resources jurisdiction. The
effect a patrimonial sea would have on the high seas in relation to
land-based pollution is uncertain. It might well result in the increased use of a geographically reduced high seas for disposal of
land-based polluting waste by littoral States which naturally
would
7
be reluctant to foul their own economic resources zones.
Definition of Customary InternationalLaw
Before one attempts to determine whether customary international
law embraces a general prohibition against land-based pollution of
the high seas, the initial hurdle of defining customary international
law must be cleared. The problem of definition is one which has
continued to bother the International Court of Justice (ICJ), tribunals
and publicists alike. It is not unlike the situation faced by the United
States Supreme Court in attempting to define obscenity. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Stewart, "I can't-define it, but I know it when I see
it."8 There is general agreement (although it is by no means unanimous) that the most suitable definition of customary international
law requires the presence of two interrelated elements: the general
practice of States and the acceptance of the general practice as law.
However, there exists considerable controversy about the meaning,
weight and scope to be assigned to each element.
General Practice of States
The "general practice of States" contains two self-evident qualifications on practice: "of States" and "general." The "of States"
7. The N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 2, reported that a "major clash"
is developing concerning objections of "high-level" diplomatic, defense and
Law of the Sea Conference officials to enforcement efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency of a recent amendment to the Clean Water Act prohibiting dumping of oil and other hazardous substances within 200 miles of the
United States' coast. In 1969 the International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea reported in a similar vein with regard to West Germany:
The Federal Republic has very little industry near the coast and there
are no important industrial discharges directly to the sea. The main
industries of the Federal Republic at present discharge their effluent to
inland waterways, but under the new laws for pollution control much of
the present pollution will have to stop. As a result many industries are
turning to sea disposal as an alternative. Since coastal water pollution is
now also controlled this sometimes means dumping beyond coastal
waters.
REPORT OF THE ICES WORKING GROUP ON POLLUTION OF THE NORTH SEA, Co-

OPERATIVE RESEARcH REPORT 12, § A, No. 13 (1969).
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).

qualification eliminates the acts of private organizations, decisions
of the ICJ and tribunals, the writings of publicists and so forth, from
a vanguard role either in the formation of customary international
law or in the confirmation of the continuing application of existing
customary international law norms to new situations. However, the
response of States to the acts and views espoused by these "nonStates" may indeed qualify as State practice. For example, compliance by litigant States with decisions of the ICJ and reliance
by members of the international community on its pronouncements
concerning customary international law certainly constitute State
practice. In addition, appropriate "non-State" activity may play an
important subsidiary, evidentiary role in affirming the existence of
customary international law. Reliance on this sort of evidence is not
to be undervalued. Although pertinent "non-State" activity may not
create custom in the strict sense, it may serve as a useful pair of legal
spectacles through which one can see that customary international
law has emerged.
State practice is comprised of both positive and negative acts. The
latter is usually expressed in the form of protest by States and may be
found in diplomatic notes,9 instructions to a State's own executive
bodies (ambassadors, envoys, armed forces and so forth) and pleadings before the ICJ and tribunals and the like. At present, however,
protests against land-based pollution of the high seas have not been
frequent. This might be explained by the "newness" of the problem,
the difficulty of acquiring proof-both of the resulting injury to the
high seas and of the land origin of the pollution-and the fact that
protest is not the most effective means of pollution control. As a
practical matter pollution is best controlled through inter-State
cooperation and joint action. Thus, practice is more likely to be
reflected through the positive acts of States in attempting to effectuate inter-State pollution controls. However, there do exist some
clear examples of negative practice, one of which is to be found in
Australia's and New Zealand's pleadings submitted to the ICJ protesting against land-based pollution of the high seas by France in the
Nuclear Tests Case.10
Positive State practice includes participation in bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, municipal laws and municipal judicial decisions which rely either principally or in relevant part on
international law. Treaties inherently raise the problem of determining when they reflect the recognition of a pre-existing custom and
9. At least one publicist questions the utility of relying on diplomatic correspondence in any event. A. D'AATo, TnE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM ININTERNATIONAL LAw 50-51 (1971).
10. [19741 I.CJ. 253.
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when they reflect an intention to adopt entirely new obligations. This
problem may often be resolved by evidence of customary international law existing outside the treaty, by the number of parties to a
treaty, or by the number of treaties with the same asserted norm
incorporated uniformly in the various agreements. With regard to
municipal legislation and court judgments, caution must be exercised to differentiate between the purely municipal law grounds and
the international law bases of statutes and decisions. Nevertheless,
State practice reflected by municipal law is relevant to the formation
of customary international law. As De Visscher has said: "Such internal acts are relevant in that they are to be taken into consideration
when the number and importance of parallel instances justify regarding them as a line of conduct adopted by States in the belief that
it is in conformity with international law."" However, considerable
mechanical difficulties of assembly are encountered when one attempts to construct this line of conduct for a particular customary
international law rule. These difficulties, combined with the equally
difficult problem of separating out the purely municipal law grounds
of court decisions, may explain, in part, the absence of greater reliance on municipal law in custom formation.
The other qualification on State practice is that it be general. This
requires a distinction between local and general custom." It is
conceivable that, for geographic or other reasons, a customary international law rule may be confined to a particular group of States, in
which case generality of practice need be established only for these
States. On the whole, special or local custom presents no generality
problem other than defining the group of States said to be affected by
the special customary rule and determining whether all States within
this group have consented to the custom. In contrast, a general
customary rule of international law is applicable to all States, and the
question arises: How general must the practice of States be to constitute customary international law?
With regard to general custom, a certain amount of State practice,
accompanied by acquiescence of affected States in the practice or an
absence of protest by other States, is necessary to give it life and
substance. The nature and extent of the practice required in a given
11. C. DE VISSCHER,

THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAW 158

(rev. ed. 1968).

12. See D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in InternationalLaw, 63
Am. J. INT'L L. 211 (1969); MacGibbon, Customary InternationalLaw and Acquiescence, [1957] 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115 (1962).

instance may vary according to particular legal and historical facts,
though certainly universality of practice is not demanded in any case.
In order for a new rule of customary international law to oust an
existing rule of custom which has been well-established over a long
period of time (for example, a proposed new rule of custom permitfing a coastal State to exercise pollution control to a limit of 200
miles offshore), the generality requirement would be satisfied only by
acts of a large number of States in support of the new rule demonstrating a consistent practice over a period of time.
However, the necessity for generality may not be as stringent
where an existing customary international law obligation is adapted
to new situations where there is no existing conflicting rule to supplant. 13 Here, customary international law may develop in a relatively short time 4 through the practice of those vanguard States which
are in a position to act. For example, with regard to customary law
formation and outer space, Thirlway has observed:
[Ilt is true that in regard to a branch of law of this kind, very little
practice might be regarded as sufficient, and that the fact of only two
States being at present in a position to contribute to the practice
implies that the practice of those two States would, if it were consistent enough, be sufficient [to constitute customary international
law. 15

Historically, little attention has been paid to land-based pollution
of the high seas, the earth's last great resource frontier, and it is only
recently that States have begun to develop the scientific and technological capability to explore, measure, monitor, and diagnose pollution of the high seas. At present these efforts are limited to relatively few areas of the high seas, notably those contained in enclosed or
semi-enclosed seas such as the Mediterranean, North and Baltic Seas,
13. De Visscher, Cours Gdndralde DroitInternationalPublic,ACAD MIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 136 RECUEIL DES CouRs 1, 69 (1972).
14. C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 n.2
(1965) (citations omitted), contains the following footnote on the time requirement in custom formation:
Judge Fitzmaurice says however, that "A new rule of customary international law based on the practice of States can emerge very quickly,
and even almost suddenly, if new circumstances have arisen which
imperatively call for regulation though the time-factor is never wholly
irrelevant .... " Brierly suggested to the International Law Commission that "in regard to the air, the moment the 1914 war broke out, the
principle of sovereignty, which had been a matter of opinion up to then,
was settled at once." Professor Jennings says: "It may be harmless to
think... of the law of the continental shelf as a sort of hot-house forced
custom even if it is rather quaint."
15. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 71 (1971),
commenting on the prohibition against appropriation of celestial bodies
contained in paragraph 3 of the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 18 U.N.
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with the result that State practice of land-based pollution control in
the high seas in the form of actual conduct is less than abundant. The
opportunity to generate practice and thereby contribute to the adaptation of customary international law principles is limited at present
to a relatively small number of States by scientific and technological
barriers which are similar to the impediments placed on the opportunity to practice in outer space. This limitation is of little import if one
is concerned with making a case for a local custom only. But if,
considering both the potential for harm on a global basis and the
international character of the high seas, one wishes to say that this
limited practice supports a customary international law prohibition
against pollution to all land-based activities affecting the entire high
seas, then one must satisfy the generality requirement. Assuming the
analogy to outer space is appropriate, the generality requirement
may be fulfilled when there is consistent practice by States, as opportunities arise, and acquiescence by other States to that practice (for
example, to the absence of protest about trespass by communication satellites in the territorial air space). As Kunz has said: "The
practice must have been applied by the overwhelming majority of
16
states which hitherto had an opportunity of applying it."'
Acceptance of the General Practice as Law
The psychological element of the acceptance of the general practice of States as law (opinio juris) has been a source of much debate
among legal scholars. Some publicists consider that its presence as
an element in the definition of custom, involving as it does the
motives of States, renders a determination of customary international law too difficult 17 or too arbitrary. 8 Some writers have even
suggested its presence in any form is unnecessary. 19 Despite such
objections, opinio juris is generally considered by the ICJ and the
GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). Thirlway concludes that as no

"use and occupation" had been undertaken by 1963, it was impossible to speak
of crystallized rules of customary international law.
16. Kunz, The Natureof CustomaryInternationalLaw, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 662,
666 (1953) (emphasis added).

17. Gihl, The Legal Character and Sources of InternationalLaw, 1 ScAN-

DINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 53, 84 (1957).

18. Kelsen, Thdorie du droit internationalcoutumier, 1 REVUE INTERNATION-

AL DE LA THEORIE DU Duorr 253, 264-66 (1939).

19. Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creationof InternationalLaw,
[1937] 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 127 (1962).

majority of publicists as essential to distinguish between acts of
States which are matters of courtesy and convenience (mere usage)
and those acts which States believe possess some real or potential
legal effect (custom). 20 However, even among those who agree about

its necessity in defining customary international law, there are differences of opinion about its scope and meaning. D'Amato points out
there is a school of publicists who imply that opiniojurisis all-that
it is "paramount, and the overt acts of [S]tates are at best the evidence of this implied consent (or at worst its illegal contradiction)., ,21
Perhaps the most realistic perspective of State practice and opinio
juris is that neither the "material" nor the "psychological" element
dominates and that one depends on the other for its demonstration.
In other words, it is opinio juris which tests whether the sum of the
practices dealing with land-based pollution of the high seas is accompanied by a sense of legal obligation, and, in turn, it is the
general practice of States which helps one to decide by factual evidence the existence of opiniojuris.Viewed in this light opiniojurisis
neither unnecessary nor the sole criterion in establishing customary
international law. As Thirlway defines it:
[T]he requirement of opinio juris is equivalent merely to the need for
the practice in question to have been accompanied by either a sense of
conforming with the law, or the view that the practice was potentially
law, as suited to the needs of the international community, and not a
mere matter of convenience or courtesy .... The psychological element would thus also include the view that if the practice in question
22
was not required by the law, it was in the process of becoming so.
20. Article 38(1)(b) of the Court's Statute refers to "international custom...
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." The Statute of the Court, art.
38(I)(b), reprintedin DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 60,77
(S. Rosenne ed. 1974). See The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 3, 28;
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 1. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 7-9 (1973); C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND
REALITY iN PUBLIc INTERNATIONAL-LAW 154 (rev. ed. 1968). Judge Hudson includes opinio jurisin his definition of customary international law submitted to
the International Law Commission, Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4116 (1950), reprintedin [1950] Y.B. INT'L L. COMI'N 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4lSer.A/1950/Add. 1. See generally C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND
EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1965); H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAw AND CODIFICATION 46-60 (1972); Mosler, The InternationalSociety
as a Legal Community, AcADMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 140 RECUEIL DES

COuRS 1, 125-29 (1974).
21. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1971)
(referring to Anzilotti, Corbett, Strupp, Tunkin and Cheng).
22. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 53-54
(1971). The International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 44, takes a more restrictive view of opinio juris with regard
to the equidistance rule in the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the
court's opinion,
[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
niust also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio jurissive

418
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Thirlway goes on to explain what, in his opinion, occurs as a rule of
customary international law evolves:
In effect, this view involves the reversal, chronologically speaking, of
the expression opinio juris sive necessitatis,and entails considering
that the States which initiate the practice which is to grow into a rule

of customary international law act under the influence of an opinio
necessitatis-but an opinion that the practice in question is necessary
as law, not merely as a matter of convenience-, and that as a result of
such practice a legal rule comes into being, so that States subsequently acting in accordance with it can be said to be acting in accordance
with opinio jutis in the strictest sense. The opinio necessitatis in the
early stages is sufficient to create a rule of law, but its continued
existence is dependent on subsequent practice accompanied by opinio

juris, failing which the new-born rule will prove a sickly infant, and
fail to survive for long.D

This would seem to be close to what actually happens. Initially, an
opinio necessitatis is sufficient for the creation of a rule or the
adaptation of an existing general principle of international law to
new situations, but its continued existence or application depends on
the ultimate establishment of an opinio juris.
Hermann Mosler takes a similar albeit a more expansive approach
with regard to opinio juris:
In order not to make the development of customary international law
too difficult, it must be acknowledged that the acts of governments
and their agents in relation to an evolving rule are indicative of that
State's conviction that it must comply with a legal duty. But the existence of such a conviction cannot be expected in the early stages of the
evolution of a custom. To require otherwise would be to insist upon
the paradoxical need for a belief in the existerice
of a legal obligation
24

as a pre-requisite for its actual creation.

The view represented by Thirlway and Mosler might be said to
accurately reflect what is happening with regard to land-based pollution of the high seas, where the initial reaction of States to the
pollution problem may be said to be motivated by the belief that
some law is needed in this area. Whether, as a result of any steps
taken, States in the future may be said to be acting in accordance
with opinio juris and hence assure the continued application of a
customary international law rule not to pollute the high seas from
land-based sources is a question which underlies the discussion benecessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or
even habitual character of the acts, is not in itself enough.
23. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 55-56
(1971).
24. Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, ACADMiR DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 126-27 (1974).

low. That discussion focuses on analogous areas of international
law (international rivers, air pollution, hostile expeditions and outer
space), protests of States, treaties, judicial decisions, United Nations
activities (the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment,
General Assembly Resolutions and the Third Conference on the Law
of the Sea), declarations of regional organizations, municipal law,
and the work of the International Law Association.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HIGH SEAS

The legal status of the high seas as free from any State's exclusive
jurisdiction and thus a res communis reaches back to the 17th century and Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum. Although Grotius' premise
for a res communis high seas-the inexhaustibility of the high seas
resources-turned out to be false, the concept of community ownership nevertheless survives to the present day. The essence of the
notion of the freedom of the high seas this implies was put succinctly
by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht as "the reasonably conceived principle of
freedom of navigation and exploitation of their riches not dependeant for their protection and preservation upon the exclusive efforts
of the coastal state. '25 The contradiction inherent in a high seas of
limited size and resource potential with no protective jurisdiction
over its use was commented on by O'Connell with specific reference
to pollution:
That the principle of the freedom of the high seas is inherently
ambiguous may be gathered from analysis of the problem of pollution. On the one hand freedom may mean absence of constraint from
discharging fuel oil; on the other it may mean competence to traverse
and use an unpolluted26sea. On either argument the freedom of the sea
is the major premise.

It is the accomodation of this sort of conflict which underlies any
attempt by States to control land-based pollution of the high seas.
While it may be true that a growing body of international law
exists to deal with ocean-based pollution, 7 which in certain respects
25. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, [1950] 27 BRIT. Y.B.
L. 376, 378 (1962).
26. 2 D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 710 (1965).
27. The major conventions and agreements dealing with ocean-based pollution include International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, London, May 12, 1954, in force July 26, 1958 (amended in 1962, 1969 and
1971); Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82, inforce Sept. 30, 1962; Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, in force Sept. 10, 1964; Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, done at Brussels, May 25,
1962 (not yet in force), reprinted in BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
INT'L

COMPARATIVE LAW, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA

(1958-1964), at 196

(1965); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
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overlaps into the area of land-based pollution, the majority of high
seas pollution comes from land-based sources and remains largely
2
uncontrolled.
However, it cannot be denied that "the customary law of the sea is
at present undergoing change in several respects." 29 This change is
Space and Under Water, done at Moscow, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-United
Kingdom-Soviet Union, in force Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 45;
Agreement Concerning Co-operation to Ensure Compliance with the Regulations for Preventing the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done at Copenhagen, Dec. 8,
1967, in force Jan. 8, 1968, 620 U.N.T.S. 226; Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), done at London, Jan.
7, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 497 (1969); Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, done at Bonn, June
9, 1969, in force Aug. 9, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 359 (1970);
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done at
Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERmALS 45 (1970); Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, done at Copenhagen, Dec. 17, 1971, inforce Oct. 16, 1971, 822 U.N.T.S. 311,
reprintedin

NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE

SEA 454 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16; Convention
Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
done at Brussels, Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 277
(1972); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done at Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971,
reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 284 (1972); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done at Oslo,
Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO
THE LAW OF THE SEA 457 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.

B/16; Convention of the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, & Washington, Dec.
29, 1972, reprinted in

NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE

464 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/16;
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done at
London, Nov. 2, 1973, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1974, reprintedin 12 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973); Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done at Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in 13
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 544 (1974).
28. For example, with regard to oil pollution it has been estimated that discharges of oil from coastal refining, industrial and municipal waste, urban and
river run-off and atmospheric rainout during the period 1969-1971 comprised
3,300,000 tons out of a total of 6,113,000 tons which reached the marine environment from all sources. This means that over one half (54%) of all marine oil
pollution comes from land-based sources. UNITED STATES NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCE, PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 6 (1975). A more extravagant estimate is that land-based activities account for as much as 90% of all
marine oil pollution. COMM. ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED & OCEAN
LAW OF THE SEA

FLOOR BEYOND THE LImITs OF NATURAL JURISDICTION, COMPETENCE TO ESTABLISH
STANDARDS FOR THE CONTROL OF VESSEL SOURCE POLLUTION 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.

138/SC. III/L. 36, at 1 (1973) (working paper presented to the United Nations Sea
Bed Committee by the United States).
29. Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, AcADMi DE
DRoiT INTERNATIONAL, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 127 (1974).

confirmed by the recent decision of the ICJ with regard to fishing
rights in the FisheriesJurisdictioncases:
Two concepts have crystallised as customary law in recent
The first is the concept of the fishery zone, the area in
years ....
which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction independently
of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a 12-mile
limit from the baselines appears now to be generally accepted. The
second is the concept of preferential rights of fishing in adjacent
waters in favour of the coastal State in a situation of special dependence on its coastal fisheries, this preference operating in regard to
other States concerned in the exploitation of the same fisheries .... 30

Would the ICJ similarly be able to find that an obligation not to
pollute the high seas from land-based sources has crystallized as a
matter of customary international law or would it be forced to admit
a legal lacuna? Perhaps more to the point is the situation in which
certain States wish to prevent pollution through cooperation with
others. Would these States be able to point to some customary international law norm prohibiting land-based pollution of the high seas,
thereby assuring other States that participation in pollution control
regimes would merely amount to compliance with existing international law?
Both courts and States in reaching decisions concerning international law would not be likely to admit there is no law. Rather it is
almost certain that they would generally look to see if existing international law is applicable by analogy and specifically if there exists
any direct evidence of international law principles applicable to
land-based pollution of the high seas.
Analogies from Existing International Law: Applications of Sic
Utere Tuo
The notion of State responsibility for pollution is a natural outgrowth of one of the basic premises upon which State responsibility
rests and which is embodied in the general and well-recognized
principle of international law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(one must so use his own as not to do injury to another).3' This is one
of those international law norms which necessarily arose to accommodate the conflicts inherent in the concept of the sovereign rights of
States. It also has roots in both Roman law and the common law
32
concept of nuisance.
30. Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) (Merits), [1974] I.C.J. 4,
23.
31. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22.
32. The Roman law prohibition of immissio-thatwater, smoke, fragments of
stone and the like were not allowed to be introduced from one person's property
to a neighboring property-was a forerunner of sic utere tuo. The most famous common law adoption of the principle is to be found in Rylands v. Fletch-
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The United Nations Secretariat confirmed the existence of this
principle. In discussing the proposed codification of international
law in 1949, the Secretariat stated: "There has been general recognition of the rule that a State must not permit the use of its territory for
purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a manner
contrary to international law." 33 The Secretariat cited as applications of the rule, inter alia, the law of international rivers, air pollution and hostile expeditions.3 4 With regard to these applications of
sic utere tuo the Secretariat further expressed the view that "[i]n
reality they form part of one aspect of international law as to which
there exists already a substantial body of practice . . . ,,s5 In the
nearly thirty years since the Secretariat's 1949 Report it may now be
permissible to add the law of outer space to its list. Assuming the
Secretariat's Report is correct, it is appropriate to inquire whether
any of these applications of sic utere tuo would permit courts or
States to say the principle by analogy also applies to land-based
pollution of the high seas.
International Rivers
Perhaps the clearest example of the application of sic utere tuo to
pollution is in the area of international rivers. Inasmuch as this topic
has been the object of repeated study, it would serve little purpose to
go into great detail here. The most concise summary for present
purposes of the general obligation not to pollute as applied to international rivers through the practice of States is the commentary to
the International Law Association's (ILA) Helsinld Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers.3 6 The Helsinld Rules, on the
basis of the practice of States and other evidences of international
er, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd., L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 E. & I.
App. 330 (1868).
33. UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, U.N.

Doe. A/CN. 4/1/Rev. 1 (1949).
34. Id. at 35.

35. Id.
36. International law imposes general limitations upon action that one

State may take which would cause injury in the territory of another
State. In the Corfu Channel Case, the International Court of Justice
stated that international law obliges every State "not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States".
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has expressed the view

that "[tihere has been general recognition of the rule that a State must
not permit the use of its territory for purposes injurious to the interest of
other States in a manner contrary to international law." This statement
is no more than a reflection of the principle sic utere tuo ut alienumnon
laedas---"onemust so use his own as not to do injury to another". The

law, articulate "general rules of international law"3 with regard to
water pollution of international rivers. 38 Assuming that the Helsinki
Rules represent an accurate statement of international law, one can
say that international law has applied, with certain refinements, the
general principle of sic utere tuo to pollution of international rivers.
same general thread of principle runs throughout the range of State-toState relationships.
As to the law of water pollution, recently this general principle was
favourably referred to in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration between France
and Spain. In discussing the division of waters of Lake Lanoux and
possible bases of France's responsibility, the Tribunal stated: "It could
have been argued that the works would bring about a definite pollution
of the waters of the Canal or that the returned waters would have a
chemical composition or a temperature or some other characteristic
which could injure Spanish interests."
Although not involving pollution of water, the Trail SmelterArbitration between the United States and Canada illustrates the general international principle upon which the rules of this article are based. There,
Canada was held responsible for the injury and damage resulting in the
United States from fumes emitted from a smelter located in British
Columbia and deposited over a large area of the State of Washington.
The Compromis for the arbitration directed the Tribunal to "apply the
law and practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the
United States of America as well as international law and practice...
However, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make a choice between the law of the United States and international law, as the former
was found to be "in conformity with the general rules of international
law". Thus the Tribunal concluded "that, under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no state has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the property of
persons therein. .. "

The Supreme Court of Italy has had occasion to state: "If this [State],
in the exercise of its sovereign rights is in a position to establish any
regime that it deems most appropriate over the watercourse, it cannot
escape the international duty ... to avoid that, as a consequence of such
a regime, other (co-riparian) States are deprived of the possibility of
utilizing the watercourse for their own national needs."
Water treaties often incorporate provisions dealing with the pollution
of waters by the signatory States. Agreements may be concluded and
administrative machinery created specifically to deal with pollution.
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. X
CONFERENCE 477, 497-99 (1967) (bracket and parenthetical original) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules]. In addition to the materials already cited, see R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS (1964); F.
BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 154 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS (A. Garretson, R. Hayton, & C. Olmstead eds. 1967); Bourne, International Law and Pollutionof InternationalRivers and Lakes, 6 U. BRIT. COLUM.

L. REV. 115 (1971).

37. Article I of the Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, at 484, makes clear the

drafters' intention to articulate the relevant general rules of international law. It
provides in relevant part: "The general rules of international law as set forth in

these chapters are applicable to the use of the waters of an international drainage basin .... " Id.
38. Water pollution is defined in Article IX as "any detrimental change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the
waters of an international drainage basin." Id., art. IX, at 494. Articles X and XI
delineate the duties and responsibilities of States concerning water pollution.
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However, before one attempts to analogize from international rivers
to land-based pollution of the high seas, two important distinctions
should be mentioned.
First, the application of sic utere tuo to international river pollution has had to accommodate the dominant concept of "equitable
utilization,"39 under which pollution of international rivers which is
"consistent with the principle of equitable utilization" is not prohibited. 40 Hence, it may be said that under the Helsinki Rules pollution which is inconsistent with the principle of equitable utilization
is prohibited. The Rules also require prevention of new forms of
water pollution and cessation and compensation in the event new
Article X
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters
of an international drainage basin, a State,
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase
in the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage
basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a cobasin State, and
(b) should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water
pollution in an international drainage basin to such an extent that
no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water
pollution originating:
(a) within a territory of the State, or
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's
conduct.
Id., art. X, at 496-97.
Article XI
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph l(a) of
Article X of this Chapter, the State responsible shall be required to
cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured co-basin State
for the injury that has been caused to it.
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph 1(b) of Article
X, if a State fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required
promptly to enter into negotiations with the injured State with a view
toward reaching a settlement equitable under the circumstances.
Id., art. XI, at 501.
39. Equitable utilization is defined in Article IV of the Helsinki Rules: "Each
basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in
the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin." Id., art. IV,
at 486.
40. As the ILA explains in its commentary to Article X:
The optimum goal of international drainage basin development is to
accommodate the multiple and diverse uses of the co-basin States. The
concept of equitable utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin has the purpose of promoting such an accommodation. Thus,
uses of the waters by a basin State that cause pollution resulting in
injury in a co-basin State must be considered from the overall perspective of what constitutes an equitable utilization.
Any use of water by a basin State... that denies an equitable sharing
of uses by a co-basin State ... is in violation of international law. ...
By parallel reasoning, a State that engages in a use or uses causing

forms of pollution cause substantial damage. In addition, sic utere
tuo requires States to undertake "reasonable measures" to abate
existing pollution and further requires States to enter into "prompt
negotiations" in the event existing pollution causes substantial damage. While it is true that equitable principles have been frequently
applied to accommodate conflicting interests in the high seas, this
application has not resulted in the evolution of a specialized doctrine
of "equitable utilization" for the high seas in the same way as it has
for international rivers. 41 Thus, if the concept of equitable utilization
is removed from the equation (as might be required in applying the
Helsinki Rules by analogy to land-based pollution of the high seas), it
would appear that the Rules impose a strict liability standard for
42
new forms of pollution.
Second, the application of sic utere tuo to pollution of international rivers is restricted to injury "caused in the territory of a co-basin
State."43 Admittedly, there is a significant difference between a
State's interests in its own territory and its interests in the high seas,
particularly with regard to a State's assertion of injury by landbased pollution to its res communis interests in the high seas. It
might be said that in the high seas generally there is a lesser foreseeability of harm, a lesser assumption of "good neighborliness" and a
more difficult task in establishing evidence of injury than exists with
regard to international rivers. However, if the injury from landbased pollution of the high seas was to ships or to persons engaged in
legitimate activities (such as navigation or fishing), the situs of harm
(State territory or the high seas) would make little difference because
it is clear that international law entitles States to protect their vessels and nationals from injury caused by other States on the high
seas.
Despite these differences, a parallel does exist between the pollution of oceans from land-based sources and the pollution of international rivers. As Judge Manner said in regard to the ILA's preparatpollution is not required to take measures with respect to such pollution
that would deprive it of equitable utilization.
Id., art. X comment (b), at 499. See Utton, InternationalWater Quality Law, in

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 154, 167-69 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds.

1974).
41. See note 216 infra. See also Davis, Theories of Water PollutionLitiga-

tion, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 738, for the common law distinctions between the United
States equivalent of "equitable utilization," "reasonable use," and nuisance
concepts with regard to riparian rights and the discharge of wastes.
42. Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, arts. X(1)(a) & XI(1), at 496-97, 501. The ILA
Draft Articles on land-based marine pollution abandon the concept of equitable
utilization in adapting the Helsinki Rules to land-based marine pollution. See
text accompanying notes 205-24 infra.
43. Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, art. X, at 496-97.
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ory work on the Helsinki Rules: "The problems concerning pollution
of coastal waters may not be included in our programmes but these
problems have however a very close connection with the pollution of
fresh waters. ' 44 Both rivers and the high seas involve pollution of
international waters. In addition, they both share many of the same
land-based sources of pollution, and the ultimate recipient of pollution discharged to international rivers is the marine environment.
The connection between the high seas and international rivers was
considered sufficiently close by the ILA for it to assign the-task of
drafting land-based marine pollution rules to the same committee
that drafted the Helsinki Rules. The results of its adaptation of the
Helsinki Rules to land-based high seas pollution is examined
45
below.
Air Pollution
The United Nations Secretariat in its Report on the codification of
international law cited the Trail Smelter Arbitration4 6-in which it
was held that a State is responsible for injury to the neighboring
territory by noxious fumes emanating from works within the Stateas an "instructive example" of "duties grounded in the exclusive
jurisdiction of States over their territory ... [including] the obligation of the State to prevent its territory from causing economic injury
to neighboring territory in a manner not permitted by international
47
law.,
With the exception of the principle of equitable utilization, what
was said with regard to international rivers also applies to air pollution. As with the case of international rivers, the Trail Smelter
situation is limited to injuries caused to territorial interests and not
to State interests in the high seas. However, the evidentiary problems
involved in establishing injury by air pollution of the high seas are
considerably more complex than for international river pollution.
Nevertheless, the Trail Smelter Arbitration deals with an important
source of land-based pollution of the high seas, and it would be
reasonable to assume that its pronouncements concerning State re44. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTIETH CONFERENCE
421 (1962).
45. See text accompanying notes 205-24 infra.
46. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States-Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1905 (1949), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
47. UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS 34, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/1/Rev. 1 (1949).

sponsibility would be taken into consideration by the International
Court and States in determining whether an obligation not to pollute
the high seas exists.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration makes an additional refinement on
the application of sic utere tuo with regard to the scope of State
responsibility for the extraterritorial effects of pollution. The private
status of the Smelter factory and Canada's responsibility for its
polluting activities affecting the United States relates to the twofold
aspect of strict liability; in other words, under the Tribunal's decision there would appear to be a greater degree of care required by a
State over polluting activities originating on its territory and a greater range of persons for whom responsibility must be assumed. The
private law equivalent of the latter aspect would be the attachment
of liability not merely for the acts of servants but also for independent contractors. Thus, it might be said that under Trail Smelter the
application of sic utere tuo to pollution includes State responsibility
for the acts of private individuals and not just responsibility for
purely State activities. Indeed, if one were to view the Corfu Channel
Case in a similar light, it might even be said that prima facie State
responsibility attaches for the injurious polluting effects of conditions created on State territory by trespassers of which the territorial
48
sovereign has knowledge or the means of knowledge.
The Law of Hostile Expeditions
The general principle of sic utere tuo has also been applied to the
law of hostile expeditions. The particular factual setting which has
parallels with land-based pollution of the high seas involves "State
complicity in, or toleration of, the activities of armed bands" within
one State's territory directed against other States. 49 The United Nations General Assembly, after many years of debate on the matter,
accepted by consensus the following definition of aggression, which
includes the activities of armed bands:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations
(including] the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
[..
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State. .... 50
48. [1949] I.C.J. 4. See also Brownlie, A Survey of InternationalRules of
EnvironmentalProtection,in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2 (L. Teclaff
& A. Utton eds. 1974). It should be noted that in the Corfu Channel Case the
injury occurred within Albania's territory, and thus caution must be exercised
in making analogies to injuries occurring outside a State's territory.
49. Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 712, 734 (1958).
50. G.A. Res. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31)143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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Further, the General Assembly holds the view that acts of aggression
51
are unlawful.
Little conceptual difference exists between the application of sic
utere tuo to establish State responsibility for extraterritorial effects
of attacks by armed bands and its application to the effects of landbased pollution of the high seas, at least to the extent that another
State's individual legal interests in the high seas are involved (for
example, the activities of its nationals engaged in lawful activities
such as navigation or fishing). Here again, the shift in the situs of
harm from State territory to the high seas makes little difference,
for international law clearly entitles States to protect their vessels or
nationals from direct attack on the high seas. Thus, the only significant difference between armed bands and land-based pollution of
the high seas is in the form of injury.
Outer Space
The controlling general principles of international law relating to
outer space5 2 are found in two interrelated documents. The first is the
1963 General Assembly Resolution (adopted unanimously) which
contains a Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 53 The second is
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
51. "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, mili-

tary or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.... A war of
aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility." Id. at 143-44. See also Brownlie, InternationalLaw and
the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & Cor'. L.Q. 712, 734 (1958) ("an examination of the State practice ... shows conclusively that no State can now claim
that such behavior is lawful"); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for
Injury to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorists, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 219, 275 (1977)
("[W]here States give support to non-local terrorism by permitting individuals to

use their territory as bases for their operations, such States are engaged in
unlawful conduct.").
52. The law of outer space illustrates quite clearly that when the question of
legal rules for outer space arose in the early 1960's States did not say that
because there was insufficient State practice in this new area there was, therefore, no law to apply. Rather, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the view that "International Law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies." G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N.

GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). Implicit in this statement is the
indispensable reliance on legal analogy for establishing rights and duties in new
areas of human activity, such as land-based pollution of the high seas.
53. G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).

Celestial Bodies of 1967,54 which incorporates several unanimously
adopted General Assembly Resolutions, including the 1963 declaration of legal principles.
Accepting that the 1967 treaty represents the best evidence of
applicable principles of international law for outer space, its provisions are relevant to land-based high seas pollution in several respects.55 In Article I the treaty characterizes outer space in terms
akin to the res communis status of the high seas: "The exploration
and use of outer space. . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic
or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.156 Thus, the general regime of outer space is, like that of the
high seas, based upon community interests, free use and a prohibition of the exercise of sovereignty by individual States.
Of particular interest is Article IX, which applies the general principle of sic utere tuo to pollution of outer space:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of
them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has
reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its
nationals in outer space ...would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space ... it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experi57
ment.
54. Done at London, Moscow, and Washington, Jan. 27, 1967, in force Oct. 10,
1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 386 (1967). As of

1971 there were over 60 Contracting Parties, including the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
55. However, J. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE
15-16 (1963) (citations omitted), criticizes the Treaty as follows:
In the Outer Space Treaty we have then a rigidly contractual instrument, in essence a bilateral arrangement between the principal spaceusers. Apart from its provisions for partial demilitarization of outer
space, tracking and inspection, it does little or nothing to elaborate or
secure the principles already set out in General Assembly Resolutions.
It may even be that this ill-constructed and precarious instrument is a
retrograde step. For in the wise words of Dr. Jenks, written before the
conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty. .

. , "The

authority of the Decla-

ration of Legal Principles may be expected to grow with the passage of
years. While it is somewhat less than a treaty it must already be regarded as rather more than a statement of custom." Though Resolution 1962XVIII is for the most part a declaration, not of rules of international law,
but of directive principles, it may, like other similar General Assembly
Resolutions, be regarded as forming part of an international ordrepublic, to which States should strive to make their policies conform....
56. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. I,
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207-08, reprintedin 6 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 386, 386 (1967).

57. Id., art. IX, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209-10, reprinted in 6 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALs 386, 388 (1967).
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Concerning the range of persons for whom responsibility for pollution must be assumed, Article VI provides that States party to the
treaty "shall bear international responsibility for national activities
in outer space. . , whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities .
,,.5
Thus, responsibility would attach for acts of pollution committed by private
individuals as well as purely State instrumentalities.
Concerning the degree of care required, Article VII imposes a
standard of strict responsibility:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an

object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer
space ....59

In addition, Article VII, if applied by analogy to land-based pollution
of the high seas, would raise the possibility of responsibility attaching to States other than the State from whose territory pollution
reached the high seas. Thus, if a State polluted the high seas as a
result of the reprocessing of nuclear fuels under contract for another
State, the reprocessing State might be held responsible along with
the contracting State for any material damage.
The foregoing discussion of analogous areas of existing international law permits several observations. First, there is ample precedent in the law of international rivers, air pollution, hostile expeditions and outer space to say that sic utere tuo applies by analogy to
land-based pollution of the high seas. Second, the shift in the situs of
harm from State territory to the high seas makes little or no conceptual difference in the application of sic utere tuo to land-based
pollution of the high seas. Third, the range of persons for whom State
responsibility must be assumed may extend to private individuals as
well as State organs. In addition, responsibility may attach to third
States which procure the use of another State's territory for activities
58. Id., art. VI, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209, reprintedin 6 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS

386, 387 (1967).
59. Id., art. VII, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209, reprintedin 6 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS
386, 388 (1967). Article VII may receive its first practical application in light of

the damage caused to Canada by the crash of a Soviet satellite on Canadian
territory early in 1978. See also Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, signed Mar. 29, 1972, reprinted in 66 Am.J.INT'L
L. 702 (1972).

resulting in pollution of the high seas. Fourth, there is room for the
view that under the objective theory of State responsibility States
may be held strictly liable for land-based pollution of the high seas in
the event its activities cause injury. 60 Finally, if the discussion of
international rivers, air pollution, armed bands and outer space accomplishes nothing else, it demonstrates that if State practice so
applies sic utere tuo as to prohibit pollution of the high seas from
land-based sources, it would be wholly consistent with existing international law.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas
The best evidence of customary international law on pollution
affecting the high seas up to 1958 is contained in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which in its preamble states that the drafters
desired "to codify the rules of international law relating to the high
seas," thus making its provisions "generally declaratory of established principles of international law." 6' This prefatory language,
which is not contained in the preambles of the other three Geneva
Conventions, "leads one to think that the different language of the
preambles was intentionally adopted and that the Convention on the
High Seas must therefore be taken
presumptively to be declaratory
62
of customary international law.11
60. In general, under the preferred objective theory a State must bear responsibility for pollution originating within its territory if it is caused by State organs
or officials acting with at least apparent authority, without regard to fault. See I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 418-44 (2d ed. 1973); B.
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 218-32 (1953); C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-14 (1928); 1 G. ScHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 632-41 (3d ed. 1957); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
119-22 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974); Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, International
Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 531,531-64 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968).
The objective theory clearly applies to private entities engaged in polluting
activities, for, as acknowledged by the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration
(United States-Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1949), 35 AM. J. INT'L
L. 684 (1941), "no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another." See
I. BROWNLIE, supra at 425; 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 (3d
ed. 1957); Jim~nez de Ardchaga, International Responsibility, in MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 531, 537-38 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968). Contra, H.
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPNENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 88 (1958); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1955); Hardy, InternationalProtectionagainstNuclearRisks, 10 INT'L & COnip.

L.Q. 739, 756-67 (1961).
61. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. As of 1976, over 50 States have become
parties to the Convention.
62. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, [1965-1966] 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 288 (1968).

[VOL. 15: 409, 1978]

Pollution of the High Seas
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

To claim that the High Seas Convention raises more than a presumption of existing customary international law and that all of its
provisions are conclusive evidence of customary law as of 1958 would
be to deny that a measure of progressive development of the law
inevitably creeps into any attempt at codification. Nevertheless, certain of the Convention's bedrock provisions have come to be generally accepted as accurate articulations of customary international law,
and it provides a solid launching point for a discussion of customary
international law and land-based pollution of the high seas.
Foremost among these bedrock provisions is Article 2, which provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport

to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high

seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and
by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia,both
for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4)Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the
63
freedom of the high seas.
It is clear that customary international law envisages a wider range
of freedoms than the four listed in Article 2. The article itself refers
to "others" which are recognized, and, as the International Law
Commission has said in its commentary to Article 2: "The list of
freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restrictive.
The Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms, but
it is aware that there are other freedoms .... ,,64 Surely, as the use of
the high seas' resources increases, new freedoms will, in the natural
course of events, also come to be recognized. These could include, if it
is not already the case, freedoms to farm the plant life of the high seas
such as seaweed and phytoplankton, to extract salt and other chemicals and minerals suspended in its waters, to utilize the waters for
drinking purposes and even to capitalize on its potential as a habitat
for man.6 5
63. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 61, art. 2.
64. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprintedin [1956] 2 Y.B.

INT'L L. COW'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1.
65. See Goldie, The Management of Ocean Resources:Regimes for Structur433

However, Article 2 also recognizes that "a regime of unqualified
freedoms is not a regime of law." 66 While Article 2 confirms the res
communis status of the high seas and an open-ended number of
exercisable freedoms, it also recognizes the correlative duty of States
to exercise these freedoms or rights with "reasonable regard to the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas." As explained by the International Law Commission, "reasonable regard" means "States are bound to refrain from any acts
which might adversely affect the use of the high seas by nationals of
other States." 7
The principle of reasonable regard for the interests of other States
has been recently confirmed by the ICJ in the FisheriesJurisdiction
Case:
It is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting from
the intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire treatment
of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has been replaced by
a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of other States
and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all. Consequently,
both Parties have the obligation to keep under review the fishery
resources in the disputed waters and to examine together, in the light
of scientific and other available information, the measures required
for the conservation and development, and equitable exploitation, of
those resources .... 68

The inevitable increase in exercisable rights in the high seas will
result in a greater likelihood of conflict between competing freedoms
and hence a greater reliance on the principle of reasonable regard to
resolve these conflicts.
The question Article 2 raises with regard to customary international law as of 1958 is whether the scope of rights and duties of States in
the high seas and the standard for their exercise embrace the proposition that an act of land-based pollution amounts to an unreasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of recognized freedoms. This question requires examination of two further
provisions of the High Seas Convention, Articles 24 and 25.
It seems clear that pollution of the kind referred to in Articles 24
and 25 of the Convention violates the principle of due regard to other
States' interests in the high seas. But do these articles apply to landbased pollution?
ing the Maritime Environment, in THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 155, 155-68 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
66. Jennings, General Course of InternationalLaw, AcADEmE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, 121 RECUEIL DES

CouRs 323, 406 (1967).

67. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,

art. 27 commentary (1), U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMi'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. AICN. 4/Ser.

A/1956/Add. 1.
68. (1974) I.C.J. 31.
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Article 24 provides: "Every State shall draw up regulations to
prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the
seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions on
the subject. '69 It confirms that "the 'abuse of rights' involved in the
indiscriminate discharge into the seas of waste products has long
been recognized in relation to oil."70° However, in requiring regulations for preventing oil pollution "from ships. . . or resulting from
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil," Article
24, by its words, omits from its ambit oil pollution originating on
land and carried to the high seas by rivers, the atmosphere or agricultural run-off. The only remaining land-based source to which the
article might apply is "pipelines" transporting waste containing oil
from the land to the high seas. However, Article 24 cannot sustain
such an expansive reading.
In the commentary to Article 24's predecessor (Article 48), the
International Law Commission explains that the term "pipelines"
refers only to "[p]ollution. . . caused by leaks in pipelines or defects
7
in installations for the exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil."'
The use of the word "leaks" implies necessarily that "pipelines" does
not refer to waste pipelines designed for the very .purpose of discharging waste containing oil to the high seas but rather refers only
to "pipelines" used to transport oil from oil wells located on the
seabed to land or to tanker ships.
The limited scope of Article 24 was not, however, the result of a
conscious attempt by the drafters to exclude land-based oil pollution
from coverage. It indicates only that in 1958 the international community was not aware of the potential adverse effects that landbased oil waste might have on the high seas. This is confirmed by the
United States Department of State, which said: "[A]rticle 24 . . .
deals with the problem of oil pollution from the two potentially chief
sources, namely, surface vessel traffic and the operation of oil wells
and related activities on the continental shelf. 72a Thus, Article 24
69. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 61, art. 24.
70. D. BOwETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 45 (1967).
71. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
art. 48 commentary (4), 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 31, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 225, 286, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser.
A/1956/Add. 1 (emphasis added).

72. Conventions on the Law of the Sea:HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, 86 (1960), reprintedin 4 M. WurrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 713 (1965).

confirms the application of the general principle of sic utere tuo to
pollution of the high seas.
However, one must look to Article 25 for specific application of the
principle to land-based pollution. Article 25 provides:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas
from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any
standards and regulations which may be formulated by the
competent international organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of
the seas or air space above, resulting from any
73 activities with
radio-active materials or other harmful agents.
"Thus, when pollution does occur, and can be proved to have
damaged the interests of other States or their nationals, the disposer
State may well be deemed to be in breach of a duty of prevention laid
down in Article 25." 74 Article 25's treatment of radioactive materials

is not as restrictive as Article 24's in that it does apply to land-based
radioactive waste: first, by requiring, in paragraph 1, measures "to
prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radio-active
waste"; and second, by requiring in paragraph 2 State cooperation in
preventing pollution of the seas from "any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents."
The closing phrase-"other harmful agents"-has been seized upon by some publicists 75 as a catchall provision intended to require
preventive measures for all types and sources of pollution and not
restricted to harmful agents of radioactive materials. Such an
interpretation would amount to a recognition by the drafters that
customary international law, as of 1958, imposed a duty on States to
prevent all forms of land-based high seas pollution. It would include
the duty of State cooperation in taking measures to prevent discharges of oil (not covered by Article 24), mercury, sewage, pesticides, chemicals, and so forth from rivers, agricultural run-off,
coastal discharges and the atmosphere.
However, Article 25 is not susceptible to such an expansive reading. It is doubtful, as mentioned above, whether the international
community in 1958 was aware of the potential threat from nonradioactive land-based sources of pollution. In addition, consistent
with accepted principles of treaty interpretation, it might be said
that the term "other harmful agents" should be interpreted accord-76
ing to its ordinary meaning in the context of the treaty as a whole.
73. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 61, art. 25.
74. D. BOWETT, THE Liw or THE SEA 48 (1967).
75. E.g., E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGnME OF HYDROSPACE 195 (1971).
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, art. 31
(1969), reprinted in [1971] UNITED NATIONs CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF
TREATIEs 287, 293, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27.
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The words appear at the end of an article which has as its sole
purpose, up to these final three words, the prevention of pollution
from radioactive materials; the only other pollutant expressly covered in the Convention is ocean-based oil pollution. Arguably, it would
be an extraordinary rather than ordinary meaning if the addition of
these words so altered the purpose of Article 25 as to include every
conceivable ocean pollutant. If other land-based pollutants were to
be singled out for treatment, the ordinary course consistent with the
Convention as a whole would have been to make them the object of
additional separate articles rather than hidden as a sort of buried
torpedo at the end of Article 25. According to the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, general words in a treaty which follow special words are
usually limited to the genus indicated by the special words. Here the
general words "other harmful agents" follow the special words
"radioactive materials" and under the doctrine would be limited to
that genus. This interpretation of Article 25 is buttressed by the
International Law Commission commentary on this provision which
makes no mention of any pollutant other than radioactive materials
and atomic radiation:
(4) Finally, the Commission considered the case of the pollution of
the seas or air space above resulting from experiments or activities
with radioactive materials or other harmful agents ....
In adopting
this provision, the Commission in no way intended to prejudge the

findings of the Scientific Committee set up under General Assembly
resolution77913 CX) of 3 December 1955 to study the effects of atomic
radiation.

However, if one were to apply the teleological method of treaty
interpretation, it might be said that the term "other harmful agents"
must be given the widest possible scope in order to ensure achievement of the underlying purpose of Article 25, the prevention of
pollution.78 Thus, "other harmful agents" would embrace all forms of
ocean-based and land-based pollution presently known to exist. Given the controversial nature of the teleological approach, it is doubtful whether it serves as an adequate bootstrap to a more expansive
77. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
art. 48 commentary (4), 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 31, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COmIM'N 253, 286, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser.

A/1956/Add. 1.
78. Under this somewhat radical approach to treaty interpretation, the overall objectives and purposes of the treaty are determined, and then any ambiguity is resolved by importing the necessary substance to give effect to those
overall objectives and purposes. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 610-11 (2d ed. 1973).

reading of "other harmful agents." Of course, it may well be the case
that since 1958 the customary international law principle of sic utere
tuo has been applied by States to other types of land-based pollution.
Evidence of Customary InternationalLaw Since 1958
International Protest
It should again be mentioned that there is little evidence to date of
State practice in the form of protest against land-based pollution of
the high seas. Several factors help to explain the absence of a greater
amount of "negative" practice. First, with the exception of nuclear
waste, land-based pollution of the high seas has come to be recognized as a problem only in the last decade. Second, there are at
present severe scientific and technological limitations placed on the
ability of States to prove injury and to establish by convincing evidence the land-based origin of high seas pollution. As these scientific
and technical barriers are inevitably removed protest will undoubtedly play a more prominent role in the further refinement of any
general norm. Third, the most effective way of controlling landbased pollution is by collective preventive action on the part of
States rather than by the protest of one State to another.
There is nothing unique in positive practice playing a dominant
role in custom formation. For example, the law of outer space and the
basic doctrine of the continental shelf arose quite rapidly with a
minimum of protest. The law of outer space evolved in large part
through United Nations Resolutions and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.71 The concept of coastal State jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf first came about through the declaration of the United
States contained in the Truman Proclamation of September 28,
1945.80 In general, the response of States to this declaration was not
to protest but to issue similar positive declarations of their own.8 1So
too, the primary evidence of the application of sic utere tuo to landbased pollution of the high seas is manifested by the positive practice
of States. However, there have been three relevant protests which
deserve mention.
The first protest was by the Japanese Government against atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Pacific
Ocean, "generally taking place over an area within the jurisdiction of
79. See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.

80. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprintedin 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
485 (1945).
81. See 4 M. WmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 752-814 (1965). The
general principles of customary international law reflective of this positive
practice are enshrined in the first three articles of the Convention on the Conti-
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the United States (such as over Eniwetok atoll or its territorial
waters)."8 2 In part, as a result of previous injuries sustained by a
Japanese fishing vessel and its crew on the high seas from United
States nuclear testing on March 1, 1954,83 outside the prescribed
danger zone, the Japanese Government protested against the announced plans of the United States to conduct another series of
nuclear tests (the Hardtack series) at the Eniwetok proving grounds.
The Japanese protest of February 20, 1958, in relevant part was as
follows:
The United States Government states that every possible precaution
will be taken to prevent damage and injury to human lives and property in the danger zone and that there is no probability of any accidents
outside the danger zone. Whatever precaution is taken, however, the
Japanese Government is greatly concerned over conducting of nuclear tests and establishment of a danger zone for that purpose in view of
the fact that said zone is near to routes of the Japanese merchant
marine and to fishing grounds of Japanese fishing boats.
Accordingly, the Japanese Government would like to make clear its
views that in the event the United States Government conducts nuclear tests in defiance of the request of the Japanese Government, the
United States Government has the responsibility of compensating for
economic losses that may be caused by the establishment of a danger
zone and for all losses and damages that may be inflicted on Japan
and the Japanese people as a result of the nuclear tests. The Japanese
Government wishes to reserve the right to demand complete compensation for such losses and damages.8

The United States reply of March 5, 1958, contained the following
passage:
Finally, as the United States has previously indicated, it cannot be
regarded as established on the basis of present information that substantial economic losses will result from the establishment of the
danger area. Moreover, in view of precautions which will be observed
during the tests and existing public information with respect to maximum permissible levels of radiation, the United States Government
anticipates no economic losses from radioactive contamination of
marine life.
However, if, after the test series has ended, any evidence is officially
presented that substantial economic losses for Japan or Japanese
nationals have been incurred as a result of establishment of the dannental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499
U.N.T.S. 311. See also the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 39.
82. 4 M. WmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 546-47 (1965) (parenthetical
original).
83. The United States paid $2,000,000 to the Japanese Government in ex
gratia compensation for the injuries resulting from the 1954 nuclear weapons
tests.
84. 4 M. WmTnEAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 585-86 (1965).

ger area and the tests, the United States is prepared in the interest of
the fullest understanding and cooperation between the two countries
to give consideration to the quelstion of compensation in the light of
such evidence.8 5

Aside from questions relating to the rights and duties of States
with regard to nuclear testing per se, the preceding passages from the
exchange of notes between the Governments of Japan and the United
States are pertinent to land-based pollution of the high seas. First, as
a general proposition, the principle of sic utere tuo is recognized as
applicable to injuries sustained by States or their nationals as a
result of the land-based activities of other States. Second, the United
States Government's note suggests that State reponsibility for landbased activities affecting the high seas is not reduced or eliminated
by evidence of due care on the part of the polluting State, provided
"substantial economic loss" is suffered by another State. In other
words, it can be inferred from these diplomatic notes that the United
States recognizes that it may be strictly liable for land-based pollu86
tion of the high seas.
The second protest involves the proceedings brought by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand (as well as the attempted
intervention in the proceedings by Fiji) before the ICJ against French
nuclear tests carried out on the French territory of Muruoa in the
Pacific Ocean in the recent Nuclear Tests case. This case is discussed
in detail below. 7 Thus, it suffices to say here that the conclusions
which may be drawn from these protests are consistent with those
drawn from the exchange of notes between Japan and the United
States.
The third protest involves the recent Finnish proposal to dump
arsenic wastes in the South Atlantic. Following reports of the proposed dump, the Governments of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina
protested to the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Later, with the apparent
support of several other countries, Brazil requested the Permanent
Council of the Organization of American States to call upon Finland
to prevent the dumping. In a special session held the day before the
scheduled meeting of the OAS, the Finnish Council of State responded to the protests by deciding that the dumping might be contrary to
the 1972 London Dumping Convention and to other environmental
agreements which Finland supported and by announcing that permission to dump the wastes had been denied. 8
85. Id. at 587.

86. Of course, it could be argued that the United States note was careful to
avoid any admission of a potential legal liability.
87. See text accompanying notes 135-44 infra.
88. Professor Bilder lucidly describes the incident:
In March 1975, it was reported, particularly in the Brazilian press, that
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This incident demonstrates the effectiveness of protest when used
as a tool for preventing pollution. Of course, this effectiveness in turn
depends upon the availability of prior information which in most
cases is not readily at hand. The incident also demonstrates that
Finland abandoned its proposed dumping at least in part due to
emerging norms of international law prohibiting dumping of landbased waste on the high seas.
Treaties
A significant portion of State practice with regard to land-based
pollution of the high seas in the years following the High Seas
Convention has been manifested through bilateral and multilateral
treaties.
In contrast to the High Seas Convention, which was declaratory of
customary international law, the treaties dealing with land-based
high seas pollution discussed below appear best to be categorized as
the type of "agreement that does not expressly purport to codify or to
be declaratory of customary international law and ...

did not at the

time of drafting create new international law which only subsequently

gained the

acquiescence

of States ...

[but which

the Finnish tanker Enskeri was planning to dump several hundred
barrels of industrial waste with substantial arsenic content into international waters in the South Atlantic. The ship belonged to Neste Oy, the
Finnish State-owned oil importing and refining operations. The
company had apparently loaded the waste without first seeking the
Finnish Government's approval.
Following these reports, the Brazilian, Uruguayan and Argentinian
Governments made joint protests to the Finnish Foreign Ministry. The
Brazilian press gave extensive coverage to statements by the head of
Brazil's Special Secretariat for the Environment that "Brazil is not the
garbage pail of the world ... we still do not know exactly what the
Finnish ship is carrying, but we can guarantee that if it were something
good, they would not co ..e here to the South Atlantic to throw it away
. . ." However, these initial protests to the Finnish Foreign Ministry
produced no immediate results; the Finnish Government reportedly
initiallytook the position that the dumping plans were neither illegal nor
contrary to international agreements. At this point, Brazil, apparently
supported by several other Latin American States, requested the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States to call upon
Finland to prevent the dumping, noting their concern that Gulf Stream
currents might spread this waste throughout the South Atlantic region.
A meeting of the Permanent Council was set for 24 March. At the same
time, Brazil and several other Latin American countries asked the UN
Secretary-General Waldheim to urge the Finnish Government not to
proceed with the dumping and he agreed to do so.
On 23 March, an extraordinary Sunday meeting of the Finnish
Council of State was held to discuss the problem. Late that same day,
the Finnish Government announced that Neste Oy had been denied

international law as it
nevertheless] is consistent with customary
89
exists independently of the treaty."
Reliance on treaties as evidence of customary international law has
certain advantages:
The advantage of the employment of a treaty as evidence of customary international law, as it was at the time of the adoption of the treaty
or as it has come to be, is that it provides a clear and uniform statement of the rule to which a number of States subscribe. There is no
problem of reconciling ambiguous and inconsistent State practice of
varying antiquity and varying authority. The treaty speaks with one
voice as of one time.
Reliance on a multilateral treaty as evidence of customary international law is not conditional on any demonstration that the signatory
States have actually observed the norms of the treaty for any length of
time. The process of establishing the state of customary international
law is one of demonstrating what States consider to be the measure of
their obligations. The actual conduct of States in their relations with
other nations is only a subsidiary means whereby the rules which
guide the conduct of States are ascertained. The firm statement by the
State of what it considers to be the rule is far better evidence of its
position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that
country at different times and in a variety of contexts.90

The provisions of some of the treaties discussed below might be
said to confirm only a local or special application of customary
international law inasmuch as they apply only to defined geographical areas (i.e., the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean
Sea).91 However, such a restrictive view is unwarranted for several
permission to dump these wastes at sea. On the basis of its further
investigations, the Finnish Government had decided that the dumping
might be contrary both to the 1972 London Dumping Convention and to
other environmental agreements which Finland supported. Upon hearing the Finnish Government's decision, the Brazilian Government issued an announcement praising Finland's understanding of the concern
of nations subject to potential damage, and indicating that it had informed the appropriate international organizations of Finland's decision. Therefore, no action was taken either in the OAS or in the UN.
The international furor about the proposed dumping was reportedly
of great concern to the Finnish Government, which has vigorously supported international environmental protection efforts. There was considerable domestic criticism of the proposed dumping. And the Brazilian press subsequently reported that the Brazilian Government might
have withheld agreement for the recently-appointed Finnish Ambassador if Finland had not taken the desired action, and that the nomination
was accepted only after the Government was informed of the Finnish
decision. The arsenlc wastes were removed from the ship and will be
stored on land in Finland while a programme for safe disposal is developed and approved.
Bilder, The Settlement of Disputesin the Field of the InternationalLaw of the
Environment, ACADnEi DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 144 RECUEIL DES COURS 139,
190-91 (1975).
89. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, [1965-1966] 41 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 278 (1968).
90. Id. at 299-300.
91. See generally A. D'AATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 233-64 (1971).
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reasons. As was mentioned earlier, where the opportunity to practice
is limited by the subject-matter involved to a relatively few States,
the consistent practice of those States may be sufficient to confirm
and further amplify general customary international law for the
world community. At present the opportunity to practice land-based
high seas pollution control is limited by geographic, scientific, technological and practical considerations to enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas. Only in a relatively few small, self-contained areas can the
present techniques for determining physical causation and material
damage be employed. The opportunity to practice is further confined
to ocean areas bordered by States economically and technologically
equipped to act. However, the application of customary international
law contained in these treaties is not confined to only one local area.
Rather, the treaties apply to three separate seas, and the application
of sic utere tuo to land-based high seas pollution in these treaties is
uniform. In addition, other agreements to which reference will be
made involve parties of widely varying geographic locales. Further,
the high seas by definition are shared by all without restriction to
any particular region or to any one group of States. Even if one could
argue persuasively in favor of only a local custom on the basis of the
particular treaties, the wealth of other evidence in addition to
treaties confirms the general rather than local nature of the customary international law obligation not to pollute the high seas from
land-based sources.
It might also be said that, in any event, some of these treaties are
incapable of confirming customary international law because they
have yet to enter into force. While this may affect the implementation
of specific provisions, it does not detract substantially from their use
as evidence of State practice confirming customary international
law. Even the draft of a treaty or a treaty which has been signed but
which has not yet entered into force may have an influence as evidence of customary international law.92 All the treaties in question
here have passed through the signature stage, and the texts have been
authenticated and adopted. These are evidences of State practice from
which tangible legal effects flow. For example, the act of signature
carries with it the legal obligation "to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into
force. ' '93 In addition, in adopting a treaty text, a State agrees to take
92. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, [1965-1966] 41 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 299 (1968).

93. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, art.

that particular text as authentic and definitive and further is bound
to the text's procedural provisions for entry into force. 4 Except
where noted the treaties cited below are silent on the question of a
standard of liability.
Global Conventions
This category considers any signed conventions or agreements
which either have world-wide application to one or more sources of
land-based high seas pollution or have been concluded by States
from widely differing geographic locales.
The London Convention
on the Dumping of
95

Wastes at Sea.

In the Preamble the Contracting Parties recognize "that States
have . .. the responsibility to ensure that activities within their

jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"
and note "that marine pollution originates in many sources, such as
dumping and discharges through the atmosphere, rivers, estuaries,
outfalls and pipelines and that it is important that States use the best
practicable means to prevent such pollution. . ...96
The application of sic utere tuo to the dumping, interalia,of land07
based waste on the high seas is accomplished in Articles I,IIand IV:
Article I.
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the
effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment,
and pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter
that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea.
Article II.
Contracting Parties shall... take effective measures individually,
according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, and
18, reprintedin [1971] UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES,
OFFICIAL RECORDS 287, 291, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/1l/Add. 2.
94. Id., arts. 9 & 10, reprintedin [1971] UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL RECORDS 287, 290, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/1I/Add. 2.

The position might be otherwise if after a long period of time has elapsed, the
treaty does not enter into force.
95. Opened fir signature Dec. 29, 1972, in force Sept., 1975, reprintedin 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS1291, 1296 (1972).
96. Id., Preamble, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291, 1294 (1972).
Dumping of land-based waste is distinguishable from purely ocean-based discharges from ships.
97. Article MIdefines "dumping" as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes
or other matter from... waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever."
It also defines "sea" as "all marine waters other than the internal waters of
States." Id., art. M, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291, 1296 (1972).
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collectively, to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping and shall

harmonize their policies in this regard.
Article IV.
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting
Parties shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in
whatever form or condition except as otherwise specified .... 98

Prohibited outright is the dumping of land-based organohalogen
compounds (DDT, for instance), mercury, cadmium, persistent synthetic materials, oil, high-level radioactive wastes, biological and
chemical warfare materials and materials which taint edible marine
organisms.9 9 A prior special permit is required for dumping landbased waste containing significant amounts of arsenic, lead, copper,
zinc, organosilicon compounds, cyanides, fluorides, beryllium,
chromium, nickel, vanadium and bulk wastes as well as medium and
low-level radioactive wastes. 0 0 A prior general permit is required for
dumping of all wastes not covered by the above categories. 1 1
Concerning liability Article X provides:
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State
responsibility for damage to the environment of other States or to any
other area of the environment, caused by dumping of wastes and
other matter of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to develof liability and the settlement of
op procedures for the assessment
10 2
disputes regarding dumping.

The article stops short of imposing any standard of liability, but its
wording indicates the parties' belief that States are responsibile for
environmental damage to the high seas.
United States Cooperation Agreements
Between 1972 and 1974 the United States entered into a series of
cooperation agreements on the mutual prevention of pollution. Because an agreement to cooperate is not necessarily tantamount to an
admission of a potential legal liability, these "cooperation" agreements are less persuasive than the other agreements. Nevertheless,
they indicate both an awareness of the sources of marine pollution
98. Id., arts. I, II & IV, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291, 1295-97
(1972).

99. Id., art. IV (1)(a) & Annex I, rep7intedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291,
1297, 1310 (1972).
100. Id., art. IV (1)(b) & Annex II, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1291, 1297, 1310 (1972).

101. Id., art. IV (1)(c) & Annex MI,reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1291, 1297, 1311 (1972).

102. Id., art. X, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291, 1302 (1972).

and a recognition of the pressing need to take steps to control all

sources of marine pollution on the part of some of the major world
powers.
United States-Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics on Cooperation
in the Field of Agreement - EnvironmentalProtection.Under this
agreement the parties aim "at solving the most important aspects of
the problems of the environment and will be devoted to working out
measures to prevent pollution, to study pollution and its effects on
the environment, and to develop the basis for controlling the impact
of human activities on nature."'1 3 Areas specifically cited for implementation of the agreement include "air pollution, water pollution, environmental pollution associated with agricultural production . . . , [m]arine pollution . . . [and] legal 10and
administrative
4
measures for protecting environmental quality.'
United States-FederalRepublic of Germany Agreement on Cooperation in EnvironmentalAffairs. Under this agreement the parties
are acting in the belief that
the national environment of each country as well as the global environment must be protected for the health and well-being of present
and future generations [and that] cooperation between the two Gov-

ernments is of mutual advantage in coping with similar problems in
each country and is important in meeting each Government's responsibilities for the maintenance of the global environment. 10 5

Listed as "[p]ollution problems of mutual concern" in the agreement's Article II are "waste water treatment for industrial, municipal, and agricultural pollution . . . , sludge disposal. . . , air pollution . . . , pesticides, toxic and other harmful substances, marine
pollution [and] environmental effects of energy use ....
10
United States-Commission of European Communities. In an exchange of letters, the parties noted as an area of common interest
for cooperation the exchange of information "on pollution problems
posed by certain industries. . . , on the effects of the production of
103. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection,
art. 2, May 23, 1972, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted
in 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 921, 922 (1972).

104. Id. See also 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 451 (1972). The Agreement was implemented by the Memorandum of 21 September 1972 in which the parties set out
specific joint projects for pollution control covering land-based sources of pollution and the effects of pollution on the marine environment. Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics-United States: Memorandum of Implementation of Environmental Agreement, Sept. 21, 1972, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1408
(1972).
105. Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Affairs, May 9, 1974,
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, reprintedin 70 DEP'T STATE BULL.
673, 673 (1974).
106. Id., art. 1, reprintedin 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 673, 674 (1974).
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energy.on the environment. . . , on procedures for testing toxicity of
certain pollutants . . . , about toxic wastes . . . , [and] concerning
the input of certain agricultural activities on the environment
"107

Regional Treaties
The most comprehensive effort to control land-based pollution of
the high seas from all sources is found in multilateral treaties
concluded for the areas of the North East Atlantic (including the
North Sea), the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

The Oslo Dumping Convention'0 8
Similar in form and purpose to the London Dumping Convention,
the Oslo Dumping Convention applies to the territorial waters and
high seas of the North East Atlantic (including the Arctic Ocean and

the North Sea), although the parties in Article 3 also undertake to
apply measures adopted so as not to pollute other ocean areas outside
those covered by the Convention.

In the Preamble the Contracting Parties recognize
that the marine environment and the living resources which it supports are of vital importance to all nations. . . , that the ecological
equilibrium and the legitimate uses of the sea are increasingly
threatened by pollution ... , that concerted action by Governments at
national, regional and global levels is essential to prevent and combat
marine pollution .... that this pollution has many sources, including
...discharges through rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines within
national jurisdiction ....
[and] that the States bordering the North
East Atlantic have a particular responsibility to protect the waters of
this region. 10 9

Defining dumping in terms identical to the London Dumping
Convention so as to include dumping of land-based pollution, the
Oslo Convention's basic obligations are contained in Articles 1, 5 and
6.110 Black-listed are toxic organohalogen and organosilicon
107. Exchange of Letters Regarding the Means of Cooperation Between the
Commission of European Communities and the United States Government in
Environmental Matters, Brussels, Washington, June 4, July 1, 1974, reprinted in
71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 237 (1974).
108. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft, done at Oslo, Feb. 15, 1972, in force Apr. 7, 1974, reprinted
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 262 (1972). Signatory countries include Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.
109. Id., Preamble, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 262, 262 (1972).
110.
Article 1.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to take all possible steps to

compounds, carcinogenic substances, mercury, cadmium and persistent plastics and synthetic materials. Specific permits are required to
dump arsenic, lead, copper, zinc, cyanides, fluorides and solid waste.
The Paris Convention"'
Covering the same geographic maritime area as the Oslo Convention and undertaking to apply adopted measures to avoid increasing pollution in the seas outside the Convention's maritime area, the
Paris Convention represents the first substantive step taken by
States at the international level to treat the problem of land-based
marine pollution of the high seas by means other than dumping. It
applies under Article 3 to land-based pollution of the internal waters
of States seaward of the fresh-water limit, the territorial waters and
the high seas emanating from "watercourses, . ..from the coast
[including pipelines and]. . . from manmade structures" within the

maritime area under a State's jurisdiction." 23 It does not apply to
atmospheric sources of land-based pollution."
In the Preamble the Contracting Parties recognize the "vital importance to all nations" of the marine environment, the threat of
pollution to "the ecological equilibrium and the legitimate uses of the
sea" and the need for "concerted action" at all levels which "can and
should be taken without delay.""' 4 Articles 1, 4 and 5 set out the basic
prevent the pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.
Article 5.
The dumping of the substances listed in Annex I to this Convention is
prohibited.
Article 6.
No waste containing such quantities of the substances and materials
listed in Annex II to this Convention as the Commission established
under the provisions of Article 16... shall define as significant, shall be
dumped without a specific permit in each case from the appropriate
national authority or authorities. When such permits are issued, the
provisions of Annexes II and III to this Convention shall be applied.
Id., arts. 1, 5, & 6, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 262, 262-63 (1972).
111. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, done at Paris, Feb. 21, 1974 (not yet in force), reprinted in 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERrALS 352 (1974). Participants in the adopting Conference were, in
addition to the parties to the Oslo Convention, Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland. On June 6, 1974, the Convention was signed by Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Sweden has since announced its intention to ratify.

112. Id., art. 3, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352, 354-55 (1974).
113. However, Article 7 also requires implementation of the Convention so as
not to increase pollution in the maritime area from other sources. By implication this would include atmospheric pollution.
114. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, done at Paris, Feb. 21, 1974 (not yet in force), reprintedin 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALs 352, 352 (1974).
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undertakings."

5

Discharges to the maritime area slated for elimination under Article 4(1)(a) are "organohalogen compounds .... mercury. .. , cadmium. .. , persistent synthetic materials ... [and] persistent oils and

115.
Article I
1. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to take all possible steps
to prevent pollution of the sea, by which is meant the introduction by
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects
as hazards to human health, harm to living resources and to marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses
of the sea.
2. The Contracting Parties shall adopt individually and jointly measures to combat marine pollution from land-based sources in accordance with the provisions of the present convention and shall harmonize
their policies in this regard.
Article 4
1. The Contracting Parties undertake:
(a) to eliminate, if necessary by stages, pollution of the maritime
area from land-based sources of substances listed in Part I of
Annex A to the present Convention.
(b) to limit strictly pollution of the maritime area from landbased sources of the substances listed in Part II of Annex A to the
present Convention.
2. In order to carry out the undertakings in paragraph 1 of this Article,
the Contracting Parties . . .shall implement programmes and meas-

ures:
(a) for the elimination, as a matter of urgency, of pollution of
the maritime area from land-based sources by substances listed in
Part I of Annex A ....
(b) for the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of pollution of the maritime area from land-based sources by substances
listed in Part II of Annex A... . These substances shall be discharged only after approval has been granted by the appropriate
Authorities within each contracting State ....
3. The programmes and measures adopted under paragraph 2 above
shall include, as appropriate, specific regulations or standards governing the quality of the environment, discharges into the maritime area,
such discharges into watercourses as affect the maritime area, and the
composition and use of substances and products and shall take into
account the latest technical developments. The programmes shall
contain time-limits for their completion.
4. Furthermore, the Contracting Parties may ... implement programmes or measures to forestall, reduce or eliminate pollution of the
maritime area from land-based sources by.a substance not then listed in
Annex A to the present Convention, if scientific evidence has established that a serious hazard may be created in the maritime area by that
substance and if urgent action is necessary.
Article 5
1. The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt measures to forestall
and, as appropriate, eliminate pollution of the maritime area from landbased sources by radio-active substances referred to in Part III of Annex A of the present Convention.

hydrocarbons of petroleum origin.11116 The "less noxious" substances,
which may be discharged subject to strict limitations under Article
4(l)(b), include "organic compounds of phosphorous, silicon and tin
. . . .elemental phosphorous.

.

. , non-persistent oils.

.

. , arsenic,

chromium, copper, ledd, nickel, zinc" and substances which may
taint edible sea products. 117 Radioactive substances, "although they
display characteristics similar to those" earmarked for elimination,
are dealt with separately in Article 5 because "they are already the
subject of research, recommendations and, in some cases, measures
under the auspices of several International Organisations and In118
stitutions."
The Helsinki Convention" 9
What the States in the North East Atlantic attempt to accomplish
in two conventions (the Oslo and Paris Conventions), the Baltic
States attempt to accomplish in one. That is, the Baltic Sea States
place under a single umbrella provisions covering both ocean-based
and land-based marine pollution.
In the Preamble the Contracting Parties recognize
the indispensible economic, social and
cultural values of the marine
environment of the Baltic Sea Area 20 and its living resources... ,
[note] the rapid development of human activities in the Baltic Sea
Area .... [the] deep concern [over] the increasing pollution of the
Baltic Sea Area, originating from many sources such as discharges
through rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines, dumping and normal
operations of vessels as well as through airborne pollutants ... ,the
responsibility of the Contracting Parties to protect and enhance the
values of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area for the
benefit of their peoples ... ,[and] that the relevant recent international conventions even after having entered into force for the respecId., arts. 1, 4 & 5, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352, 353, 355-57 (1974)

(parenthetical original). See also [Nordic] Convention on the Protection of the
Environment, done at Stockholm, Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS

591 (1974).

116. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, Annex A, pt. I, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352, 368 (1974).
117. Id., Annex A, pt. II, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352, 369-70
(1974).
118. Id., Annex A, pt. m, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352, 370

(1974).

119. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic

Sea Area, done at Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974 (not yet in force), reprintedin 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 544 (1974). Signatory States include Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, Sweden and
the Soviet Union. Finland ratified on June 27, 1975, and Sweden has announced
its intention to ratify.

120. Article 1 defines the Baltic Sea Area as "the Baltic Sea proper with the

Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland and the entrance to the Baltic Sea bounded
by the parallel of the Skaw in the Skagerrak at 570 44'8" N. It does not include
the internal waters of the Contracting Parties." Id., art. 1, reprintedin 13 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 544, 546 (1974).
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tive Contracting Parties do not cover all special requirements to pro1 21
tect and enhance the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area.

The fundamental principles and obligations are contained in Article 3, which provides:
The Contracting Parties shall ...take all appropriate legislative,
administrative or other relevant measures in order to prevent and
abate pollution and to
122protect and enhance the marine environment of

the Baltic Sea Area.

With respect to dumping (as opposed to operational vessel discharges and tanker spills) of land-based waste from vessels or any
sort of floating craft, Article 9 provides quite simply that "[t]he
Contracting Parties shall .. .prohibit dumping in the Baltic Sea
Area."1

23

Concerning "hazardous substances" Article 9 provides:
The Contracting Parties undertake to counteract the introduction,
whether airborne, waterborne or otherwise, into the Baltic Sea Area
of hazardous24 substances as specified in Annex I of the present
Convention.

At present the only items listed in Annex I are DDT (and its derivatives DDE and DDD) and PCBs.
Land-based pollution other than that classified as "hazardous substances" or as "dumping" is covered by Article 6.125 Article 6, however, does not prohibit or ban outright the discharge of any substance
into the Baltic Sea. Rather, it requires that certain noxious substances be controlled and strictly limited by a prior special permit
121. Id., reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL

MrLATERIALs

544, 546 (1974) (author's

footnotes).
122. Id., art. 3(1), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 544, 547 (1974).
Section 2 of Article 3 also notes that parties cannot comply with their treaty
obligations simply by channelling pollutants which cause "an increase in the
pollution of sea areas" to seas outside of the Baltic; i.e., they may not divert

pollutants into other seas, like the Arctic or North Seas or the Atlantic, either by
sea dumping, as Finland was attempting to do in the South Atlantic, or by

putting it into rivers, estuaries or pipelines which drain into other seas.

123. Id., art. 9(1), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 544,548 (1974). The

only exceptions to the general ban on dumping are when human safety is
involved or when a prior special permit has been issued for the dumping of
certain dredged spoils.

124. Id.
125.
Article 6
1. The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
control and minimize land-based pollution of the marine environment of
the Baltic Sea Area.
2. In particular, the Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to control and strictly limit pollution by noxious substances

and materials in accordance with Annex II of the present Convention.

system to be administered by national authorities. These substances,
as listed in Annex II to the Convention, include mercury and cadmium (for urgent consideration), antimony, arsenic, beryllium,
chromium, copper, lead, molybdenum, nickel, tin, vanadium, zinc,
elemental phosphorous, phenols, cyanides, persistent toxic organosilicic compounds, pesticides (other than DDT or PCBs),
radioactive materials, acids and alkalis, oil, substances tainting edible sea products, bulk waste and lignin in industrial waste waters.
The goals and criteria for minimizing the effect of harmful substances mentioned in section 6 of Article 6 include, according to
Annex I to the Convention, the reduction of the oxygen content and
the amount of nutrients in municipal sewage to safe levels, the
treatment of municipal sewage to maintain a safe hygenic quality,
the control of the polluting load of industrial waste so as to reduce
the presence of harmful substances and the minimization of cooling
water discharges from nuclear power plants and other industries.
In addition to the prohibition of airborne "hazardous substances"
contained in Article 5, there is, in section 8 of Article 6, a "best
practicable means" test for the control of airborne pollution by noxious substances.
Concerning liability Article 17 provides:
The Contracting Parties undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to
develop and accept rules concerning responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in contravention of the present Convention,
including, inter alia, limits of responsibility, criteria and 126
procedures
for the determination of liability and available remedies.
Thus, as with the London Dumping Convention, the Helsinki
Convention fails to do more than recognize that rules for liability
must be developed.
To this end they shall, inter alia, as appropriate co-operate in the development and adoption of specific programmes, guidelines, standards or
regulations concerning discharges, environmental quality, and products
containing such substances and materials and their use.
3. The substances and materials listed in Annex II... shall not be
introduced into . . the Baltic Sea Area in significant quantities without
a prior special permit, which may be periodically reviewed, by the
appropriate national authority.
6. To control and minimize pollution of the Baltic Sea Area by harmful substances the Contracting Parties shall, in addition to... Article 5
...
aim at attaining the goals and applying the criteria enumerated in
Annex II ....
8. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to use best practicable
means in order to minimize the airborne pollution of the Baltic Sea Area
by noxious substances.
Id., art. 6, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALs 544, 548-49 (1974).
126. Id., art. 17, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 544, 552 (1974).
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The Barcelona Convention

127

The Barcelona Convention takes the same approach as the Helsinki
Convention in that it applies to both ocean-based pollution (from
ships and from the exploration and exploitation of the continental
shelf and seabed) and land-based pollution. The Convention-is structured in such a way that many of the basic obligations undertaken
are left to be implemented by later protocols.
The Preamble to the Barcelona Convention is similar in form to the
preambles previously discussed in that it recognizes the values of
the Mediterranean Sea Area,12 8 the threat of marine pollution and the
need for protective action. In addition, the Contracting Parties acknowledge
their responsibility to preserve this common heritage [the economic,
social, health and cultural value of the Mediterranean Sea Area] for
the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations ... [and]
that existing international conventions on the subject do not cover...
all aspects and sources of marine pollution and do not entirely
meet
129
the special requirements of the Mediterranean Sea Area.
The basic obligations assumed under the Convention for present
purposes are contained in Articles 4, 5 and 8.131 The Protocol on
dumping is substantially the same as the London Dumping Convention in prohibiting outright the dumping of certain substances, requiring a prior special permit for other less dangerous substances
and requiring a prior general permit for all other substances. The
127. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, done at Barcelona, Feb. 16, 1976 (not yet in force), reprinted in 15 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 285, 290 (1976). States participating in the Conference which

adopted the Convention were Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Observers included the Soviet Union,
the United States, the United Kingdom and various international organizations
and United Nations agencies. It is expected that the Convention will enter into
force in early 1978.
128. The Mediterranean Sea Area is defined in Article 1 as
the maritime waters of the Mediterranean Sea proper, including its
gulfs and seas, boun6ded to the West by the meridian passing through
Cape Spartel lighthouse, at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar and
to the East by the southern limits of the Straits of the Dardanelles
between Mehmetoik and Kumkale lighthouses.
Id., art. 1, reprintedin 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 285, 290 (1976).
129. Id.
130.
Article 4
General undertakings
1. The Contracting Parties shall ... take all appropriate measures
...to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea
Area and to protect and enhance the marine environment in that Area.

only notable deviation from the London Dumping Convention is that
the protocol prohibits the dumping in the Mediterranean Sea Area of
not only high-level radioactive wastes but also of medium and lowlevel radioactive wastes. The protocol on pollution from other landbased sources is currently under joint preparation by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health
Organization (WHO).
The foregoing conventions and cooperation agreements entered
into by a large number of States of diverse geographic, economic and
political backgrounds help to demonstrate, in language which is
strikingly uniform and consistent, the application of the general
principle of sic utere tuo to new forms of land-based pollution of the
high seas by acts of States having tangible legal effects.
Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions, as stated in Article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), are a valid "subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law" and include those of the ICJ and
international arbitral decisions.' 3 ' Strictly speaking, international
judicial decisions bind only the parties to a particular dispute requiring adjudication. 132 In practice, however, this is not always the case.
The ICJ itself has often referred to its prior decisions and to the
decisions of arbitral tribunals. 1 33 n any event, the use here of judicial
Article 5
Pollution caused by dumping from ships and aircraft
The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent and abate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area caused by
dumping from ships and aircraft.
Article 8
Pollution from land-based sources
The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area caused
by discharges from rivers, coastal establishments or outfalls, or emanating from any other land-based sources within their territories.
Id., arts. 4, 5, 8, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 285, 291-92 (1976).
131. Statute of the Court, art.38(1)(d), reprintedin DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 60, 77 (S. Rosenne ed. 1974). To the writer's knowledge there are no municipal law decisions dealing with land-based pollution of
the high seas. Of course, there are obvious analogies from the decisions recognizing the obligation not to pollute rivers and waterways.
132. E.g., Statute of the Court, art. 59, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 60, 85 (S. Rosenne ed. 1974), provides: "The decision
of the Court has no binding force except as between the parties and in respect of
that particular case."
133. E.g., Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), [1970] I.C.J. 40; Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 119; Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 131; Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46; Cases
Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, at 31, 47; The
S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 26; Advisory Opinion on Polish Postal
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decisions is not as binding precedent but rather as evidence of the
application of customary international law to land-based pollution
of the high seas.
To date there have been no international or municipal law decisions on the merits concerning land-based pollution of the high seas.
However, one recent decision, the Nuclear Tests Case, reveals the
willingness of the ICJ to assume jurisdiction over a case which raises,
34
inter alia, the issue of land-based pollution of the high seas.
The Nuclear Tests Case, 35 although resolved without a consideration on its merits, nevertheless provides valuable insight into
the ICJ's attitude regarding State protests against land-based pollution of the high seas. Australia and New Zealand instituted proceedings against France concerning atmospheric nuclear weapons tests
conducted by the French Government at its test center located on
the French Territory of Muruoa in the South Pacific Ocean. 36 Australia claimed interalia in its application that:
(ii) The deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of Australia
and its dispersion in Australia's airspace without Australia's consent:
(a) violates Australian sovereignty over its territory;
(b) impairs Australia's independent right to determine what acts
shall take place within its territory and in particular whether
Australia and its people shall be exposed to radiation from
artificial sources;
(iii) the interference with ships and aircraft on the high seas and in
the superjacent airspace, and the pollution of the high seas by radioactive137 fall-out, constitute infringements of the freedom of the high
seas.

The ICJ, at the request of Australia and because of the "immediate

possibility of a further atmospheric nuclear test being carried out by
France in the Pacific," issued a temporary injunction in 1973 proService in Danzig, [19251 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 11, at 30; S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 424-27 (1957).

134. See also the Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States-Canada), 3 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards -1905 (1949), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941), which held the United
States responsible for injury to neighboring Canadian territory by noxious
fumes originating from United States territory. See text accompanying notes
46-48 supra.
135. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 253.
New Zealand's pleadings were virtually identical to Australia's and thus reference need only be made to the disposition of the Australian claim.
136. Fiji sought to intervene in the case but its application was deferred
pending resolution of the jurisdictional issues. Id. at 255.
137. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Order), [1973] I.C.J. 99, 103.

hibiting further tests pending final resolution of the 9dispute.13 8 The
3
ICJ in its 1973 order referred to Australia's claims:
[I]t cannot be assumed a priori that such claims fall completely outside the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, or that the Government of
Australia may not be able to establish a legal interest in140respect of
these claims entitling the Court to admit the Application.

In passing, it should be noted that the form of the Australian
allegations, if representative of the sort of claim which would be
pursued in the future, would minimize the need for precise rules for
liability, damages and compensation. This is so because Australia

was pursuing a cause of action designed primarily to seek prevention
of demonstrable prospective material damage resulting from pollution of the high seas rather than ex poste facto compensation for
damage done. Subsequently the ICJ ruled that it had jurisdiction
over the case, but it failed to decide the merits of Australia's and New
Zealand's claims. Instead, it declared the dispute moot in light of a
unilateral obligation which it found to have been assumed by France
14 1
to refrain from future atmospheric tests.
In a joint dissent, four judges felt that a legal dispute existed
entitling Australia to have the case adjudicated notwithstanding the
cessation of testing by France. The dissenting judges expressed their
view that "the claims submitted to the ICJ in the present case and the
legal contentions advanced in support of them appear to be based on
rational and reasonably arguable grounds.' 142 Specifically, the joint
dissent referred to:
[a] right, said to be derived from the character of the high seas as res
communis and to be possessed by Australia in common with all other
maritime States, to have freedoms of the high seas respected by
France; and, in particular, to require her to refrain from (a) interference with ships and aircraft of other States on the high seas and in the
superjacent airspace, and (b) the pollution of the high seas by radioactive fall-out. As support for this alleged right, the Australian Government referred to [inter alia] Articles 2 and 25 of the Geneva
Convention of 1958 on the High Seas ... 143
Thus, if Articles 2 and 25 are taken as at least presumptively de138. Id. at 104.
139. Australia also alleged
[tihat any effects of the French nuclear tests upon the resources of the
sea or the conditions of the environment can never be undone and would
be irremediable by any payment of damages; and any infringement by
France of the rights of Australia and her people to freedom of movement over the high seas and superjacent airspace cannot be undone
Id.
140. Id. at 103.
141. [1974] I.C.J. 269-72.
142. Id. at 366 (jdint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jim~nez
de Ardchaga, and Waldock).
143. Id. at 361.
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claratory of customary international law, the majority of the ICJ and
the four dissenting judges seem to agree that customary international
law may be invoked before the ICJ to prohibit land-based pollution
1 44
of the high seas by radioactive materials.
United Nations Activities
The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was
held in Stockholm in June 1972.14 Representatives of 114 countries
participated in the Conference and over 500 observers were in at-

tendance representing more than 250 nongovernmental organizations. 146 The Conference adopted a Declaration on the Human Envi-

ronment consisting of a Preamble and twenty-six Principles. 147 It has
been said of the Declaration and its Principles that "the general tone
[was] one of a strong sense of dedication to the idea of trying to
establish the basic rules of international environmental law. ...
However, the Preamble of the Declaration contains no reference to

a lawmaking or a codifying intention on the part of the participants,
and it is doubtful that the Declaration on the Human Environment

demonstrates sufficiently the element of opinio juris required for all
its principles to play a direct role in the formation of customary
international law.14 9 In other words, the actions of the various State
representatives in adopting the Declaration could not be said to have
144. Quite apart from the pronouncement of the ICJ, it should be mentioned
that the acts of Australia and New Zealand in bringing their claims and the
application of the Republic of Fiji to intervene, as well as the act of France in
refraining from conducting future nuclear tests from Muruoa, could all be said
to constitute State practice confirming, inter alia, the customary international
law prohibition against land-based high seas pollution.
145. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
AIConf. 48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972), reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1416 (1972).
146. The most notable absentee was the Soviet Union.
147. It also adopted 109 Recommendations, comprising an ambitious action
plan for the future.
148. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 463 (1973).
149. The Preamble states the purpose of the Declaration as a response to the
"need for a common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the
peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment." United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
AIConf. 48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972), reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1416, 1416 (1972). See also G.A. Res. 2581, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 44, U.N.
Doc. A17630 (1969).

any real or potential legal effect sufficient to establish opiniojuris.15°
Thus, the Declaration's proper use must be as subsidiary evidence of
State practice confirming the application of sic utere tuo to landbased pollution of the high seas.
Principles 6, 7 and 21 of the Declaration all state in various ways
the belief that an obligation exists not to pollute the high seas from
land-based sources. Principle 6151 begins with the general recognition by the conferees that present discharges of toxic substances and
harmful discharges of heat into the environment must be halted. This
recognition is sufficiently broad to include toxic and harmful discharges of land-based pollutants into the high seas.
Principle 7152 states in unambiguous terms, through the use of the
word "shall," the belief that a prohibition exists against pollution of
the seas from, interalia, land-based sources. It further expresses the
conviction of the participants that this pollution must be prevented if
it either damages the marine environment in general (including the
high seas) or if it interferes with other States' legitimate uses of the
sea (including the exercise of freedom of the high seas).153 As with
similar provisions contained in the particular pollution treaties disicussed above, the phrase "all possible steps" refers only to the
method of implementation of the recognized obligation.
Principle 21154 is significant for two reasons. First, by invoking
"the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of internation150. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
151.
Principle 6
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the
release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the
capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in
order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon
ecosystems. The just struggle of the people of all countries against
pollution should be supported.
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416,1418
(1972).

152.

Principle 7
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere
with other legitimate uses of the sea.
Id. (emphasis added).
153. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, [1950] 27 BrT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 376 (1962).
154.
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charterof the United Nations
and the principle of internationallaw, the sovereign right to exploit
their resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction.
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14 and Corrigenda 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416,1420
(1972) (emphasis added).
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al law" the participants demonstrate their common conviction that
Principle 21 reflects existing law.155 Second, the conferees express a
firm belief that a State's legal responsibility includes the prevention
of land-based pollution ("activities within their jurisdiction") reaching the high seas ("areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction").
Or, as one commentator has noted, the rule of responsibility articulated by Principle 21 "applies not only to damage caused to the
environment of other States but also to any injury inflicted on the
environment of 'areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,'
such as the high seas .... "151
15 7

United Nations Resolutions

Subsidiary evidence of an international legal obligation on the part
of States not to pollute the high seas from land-based sources may
also be found in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly. Before mentioning specific resolutions a brief clarification
should be made concerning their legal effect. There are those who
contend that resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are creative of customary international law.15 8 While this may be true with
regard to resolutions addressed solely to the internal functioning of
the United Nations or its Charter (which is not material to the
present discussion), for several reasons it is generally inappropriate
to ascribe to resolutions the power of creating customary international law obligations for States. First, resolutions of United Nations
organs are not listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court as one of the recognized sources of international law. Second,
resolutions promulgated by the United Nations organization do not
constitute State practice for the obvious reason that the United
Nations is not a State. Third, even if one were to consider resolutions
as acts of States by looking to the votes of States in favor of resolu155. Professor Oda holds the view that Principle 21, as applied to land-based

pollution of the high seas "causing harm to the immediate interests of other
States... ,is a reflection of customary international law." See Colloquium,
ACADimI DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 549-50 (1973).
156. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 493 (1973).
157. See generally J. CASTAjIEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (A. Amoia trans. 1969).
158. E.g., 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (The Hague 1966); Cheng, United

Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J.INT'L L. 23 (1965).

tions, it is doubtful that these votes or the resolutions themselves
fulfill the requirement of opinio juris because they do not have a
tangible legal effect on States and are not regarded by member States
as imposing legal obligations.
This is not to say that resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly are without effect in confirming the existence of a norm of
customary international law. A resolution formally adopted by an
organization as universal as the United Nations may provide strong
corroboration of an asserted customary rule, particularly when, as is
the situation with land-based marine pollution, there exists more
than one resolution.
On January 15, 1974, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
on State cooperation concerning natural resources shared by two or
more States,
frleaffirming principle ...21 .. .of the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment ....[riecallingits
resolutions 2995... [and] 2996 of 15 December 1972 relating to cooperation between States in the field of the environment [and] to
international responsibility of States in regard to the environment
....[and] [rjeaffirming the duty of the international community to
adopt measures to protect and improve the environment, and particularly the need for continuous international collaboration to that end
159

As was seen above, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference as
reaffirmed by the General Assembly would prohibit land-based pollution of the high seas. 60 Certainly the reaffirmation of the general
duty of States "to protect and'improve the environment" includes
protecting the high seas from land-based pollution.
Further corroboration of this duty can also be found in Resolutions
2995 and 2996, adopted by the General Assembly in 1972. Resolution
2995 on cooperation between States in the field of the environment
"[e]mphasizes that, in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside their national jurisdiction.' 161 The high seas qualify as one of the zones situated outside
a State's national jurisdiction, and the term "significant harmful
effects" embraces those land-based pollutants which reach the high
seas.
In Resolution 2996, entitled International Responsibility of a State
in regard to the Environment, the General Assembly "[r]ecailts]
159. G.A. Res. 3129,28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3129 (1974), reprintedin
13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 232 (1974). This resolution was passed by a vote of 77
in favor to 5 against, with 43 abstentions.
160. See note 154 supra.
161. G.A. Res. 2995,27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
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principle 21 ... of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment concerning the international responsibility of States in regard to the environmental, [and] [b]ear[s] in mind
that [this] principle [inter alia] lay[s] down the basic rules governin1g
this matter ... ."I" By Resolution 2996 the General Assembly once
again invokes Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference and further
states the belief that it is an accurate statement of the existing law
governing the environment.
Finally, the General Assembly, "desirous of contributing to the
creation of conditions for... the protection, preservation and enhancement of the Environment," adopted by resolution on December
12, 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which
contains the following provision relevant to land-based high seas
pollution:
Article 30. The protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment for the present and future generation is the responsibility
of all States. All States shall endeavor to establish their own environmental and developmental policies in conformity with such responsibility. The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not
adversely affect the present and future development potential of developing countries. All States have the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond limits of national
jurisdiction. All States should cooperate in evolving international
norms and regulations in the field of the environment. 16

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
Following the Sixth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in New York, which ended on July 15,
1977, an Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) was issued,
which included Draft Articles on the Protection and Preservation of
the Marine Environment.6 4 Because it is a draft its use must be as
subsidiary evidence confirming the application of sic utere tuo to
land-based high seas pollution. In addition, it should be mentioned
that many of the revised draft's provisions may be subject to radical
change before any convention is adopted by the Conference.
Nevertheless, if the conferees eventually agree on a new law of the
162. G.A. Res. 2996,27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
163. G.A. Res. 3281,29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
164. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/pt. XII (1977). The original Informal Single

Negotiating Text was issued following the 1975 Geneva Session of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 621WP. 8/pt. 3 (1975), and revised following the fourth

session ending May 7, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 3 (1976).

sea convention, it can be reasonably expected that the basic obligations presented below will survive more or less in their present form.
The ICNT on the marine environment recognizes in Article 193 that
"States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment."'165 It further provides in Article 195 in particular reference to land-based pollution as follows:
States shall take all necessary measures consistent with the present
Convention to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source... [and] shall take all necessary measures to ensure that... pollution arising from incidents or activities
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas
where they exercise sovereign rights .... These measures shall in-

clude.., those designed to minimize to the fullest possible extent:
(a) Release of toxic, harmful and noxious substances, especially
those which are persistent:
(i) from land-based sources;
(ii) from or through the atmosphere;
(iii) by dumping.166
These basic provisions have been preserved without major change
from the original 1975 Negotiating Text, and the belief that they will
also survive later negotiating sessions of the Conference essentially
intact is substantiated when one views the uniformity of earlier Draft
Articles on the topic submitted by various delegations before the
original negotiating text was issued in 1975. These earlier Draft
Articles were among the sources utilized in preparing the original
Negotiating Text.
Kenya:
Article 3
States... have the obligation to protect and preserve the quality
and the resources of the marine environment ....
Article 4
States shall take all necessary measures to prevent or control pollution of the marine environment.... In particular, States shall take
measures to ensure that activities carried out under their control or
within the area under their jurisdiction do not cause damage by pollution of the marine environment.
Article 5
States shall ensure that measures taken . .. shall deal with all
sources of pollution of the marine environment, whether land, marine
or any other sources including, rivers, estuaries, the atmosphere,
pipelines, outfall structures, vessels ....Such measures shall include,
inter alia:

(a) with respect to land-based sources of pollution.., measures
designed to minimize the release of toxic, harmful and persistent
substances into the marine environment ....167
165. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 621WP. 10, art. 193 (1977).
166. Id., art. 195.
167. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 3/L. 2 (1974).
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Israel:
Article 1. Every State undertakes to make the discharge of 168
pollutants into the sea an offence punishable by adequate penalties.

Joint Draft Articles of Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India,
Iran, New Zealand, Phillipines and Spain:
I.
States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
III.

(1) States shall take all necessary measures to prevent pollution of
the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the
best practicable means in accordance with their capabilities, individually or jointly as appropriate, and according to their own environmental policies.
(3) The measures taken... shall deal with all sources of pollution
of the marine environment, whether air, land, marine, or any other
sources. They shall include inter alia:
(a) In respect of land-based sources of pollution of the marine
environment, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures, measures designed to minimize the release of noxious and
harmful substances, especially persistent substances,
into the marine
169
environment to the fullest possible extent.
Joint Draft Articles of Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Netherlands,
Poland and the United Kingdom:
Article 1.
States shall establish [international and national] regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from
170
land-based sources.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Article 1.
States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that pollution of
the marine environment arising from activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread to the marine environment outside
their territorial sea7 and does not cause damage to other States and
their environment.' '

Concerning the liability question, the ICNT also recognizes in general terms State responsibility for damage caused to the marine
168.
169.
170.
171.

U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
U.N. Doc. AIConf.
U.N. Doc. AIConf.
U.N. Doc. AIConf.

62/C. 31L. 5 (1974).
62/C. 3/L. 6 (1974).
62/C. 3/L. 24 (1975).
63/C. 3/L. 25 (1975).

environment in violation of international law (for example, under
Draft Articles 193 and 195 above), the duty to provide municipal law
mechanisms for facilitating compensation or injunctive relief and a
present duty to cooperate in the further development of international
law in these regards:
Article 236.
1. States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international
obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international
law for damage attributable to them resulting from violations of these
obligations.
2. States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other
relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the maritime environment by persons, natural or juridical, under their jurisdiction.
3. States shall co-operate in the development of international law
relating to criteria and procedures for the determination of liability,
the assessment of damage, the
172 payment of compensation and the
settlement of related disputes.

Although Draft Article 236 is silent about whether liability is strict
or limited, it does recognize that the scope of acts for which a State is
responsible also includes the acts of private individuals as well as
acts of State instrumentalities.
17 3
Declarations of Regional Organizations

Declarations of regional organizations do not carry with them
tangible legal effects sufficient to satisfy the requirements of opinio
juris. However, they do share with treaties the advantage of providing a clear and uniform statement of a viewpoint to which a number
of States openly subscribe and as such constitute a useful source of
evidence of customary international law.
174

Declarationof the Council of European Communities

On November 22, 1973, the Council of European Communities
declared a Programme of Action of the European Communities on
the Environment, which contained the following statement:
172. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62fWP. 10, art. 236. Caution must be exercised in
reading too much into Article 236 because it fails to define what "international
obligations" States have, to preserve and protect the marine environment.
173. See also, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development:
Council Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution,
O.E.C.D. Doc. C (74) 224, Nov. 21, 1974, reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
243 (1975). "[Tjhese principles deal with pollution originating in one country and
having effects within other countries." Id.
174. Declaration of the Council of European Communities and Representatives of Governments of the Member States Meeting in Council of November 22,
1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Enviroment, 16 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. C 112) 1 (1973).
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[T]he serious problems posed by the pollution of certain zones of
common interest (marine pollution, pollution of the Rhine basin and
certain frontier zones) will require the introduction of special measures and procedures in a suitable framework, taking into account the
geographical characteristics of such zones. Thus as far as marine
pollution is concerned, Community action will consist of ... implementing projects to combat17 land-based
marine pollution along the
5
coastline of the Community.
7 6

Declarationof Santo Domingo'

At the initiation of the Colombian Government, a Specialized
Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the
Sea (held in Santo Domingo in June, 1972) issued a declaration
containing provisions dealing with the territorial sea, patrimonial
sea, continental shelf, deep seabed and the following provision on
marine pollution:
1. [It] is the duty of every State to refrain from performing acts
which may pollute the sea and its seabed, either inside or outside its
respective jurisdictions.
2. The international responsibility of physical or juridical persons
damaging the marine environment is recognized ....17

Organization of African Unity Declarationon the Law of
the Sea

178

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity,
meeting in May, 1973, issued a Declaration on the Issues of the Law of
the Sea which recognized "that every State has ... an obligation in

the prevention and control of pollution of the marine environment '17 9 and which contained the following provision:
175. Id., Annex I, ch. 1, § 8, 16 O.J. EuR.Comm. (No. C 112) 1, 10 (1971).
176. Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the Sea: Declaration of Santo Domingo, done at Santo Domingo de
Guzman, June 9, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 892 (1972). Fifteen
countries took part in the proceedings, and the Final Declaration was signed by
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. See also Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/28
(1970).
177. Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the Sea: Declaration of Santo Domingo, done at Santo Domingo de
Guzman, June 9, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 892, 893 (1972)
(bracket original).
178. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/89 (1973). See'
also Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/79 (1972).
179. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/89 (1973).

African States shall take all possible measures, individually or jointly, so that activities carried out under their jurisdiction or control do
not cause pollution
180 damage to other States and to the Marine environment as a whole.

Thus the Organization of African Unity expresses the view that
States are obligated not to pollute the high seas ("marine environment as a whole") from land-based sources ("activities carried out
under their jurisdiction or control").
8
Municipal Legislation' '

Municipal legislation used as evidence of State practice confirming
the application of sic utere tuo to land-based pollution of the high
seas must meet two requirements. First, the municipal legislation in
question must, in fact, apply to land-based pollution of the high seas.
Second, it must be demonstrated that the legislators were motivated
by either a sense of conforming to an international duty or the need

18 2
to control land-based pollution of the high seas.
The second requirement is by far the most difficult to establish. Of
course, if the legislation in question states that it is being enacted to
fulfill an international law obligation there is no problem. However,
even where the particular municipal law is silent about its raison
d'etre, as is usually the case, the second requirement may be implied,
provided there is either an urgent need for pollution control or a
significant number of States which have enacted similar pieces of
legislation. As Oppenheim says, such "uniform municipal legislation
constitutes in a substantial sense evidence of international

custom."' 8 3

In recent years a growing number of States have enacted legislation which fulfills this two-step requirement.
Canada
By the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970184 Canada
extended its functional control over pollution to a portion of the
Arctic waters up to 100 nautical miles beyond the Canadian mainland and archipelagic baseline. Without entering into the controversy this Act has provoked with regard to ocean-based pollution, it is
significant to observe that it also applies to the deposit of detrimental
waste by "any person who carries on any undertaking on the main180. Id.

181. See also WHO/UNEP SECRETARIATS: PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AGAINST POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SouRcEs: A SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, WHO AND UNEP, Geneva (1976).

182. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
183. 1 L. OPPENHEm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 n.3 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
184. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 2 (1st Supp. 1970).
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land or islands of the Canadian arctic," imposing a standard of strict
liability for pollution from land-based sources. The Act also makes
the pollutor subject to criminal prosecution. 185 The Canadian legislation was enacted because of the fragility of the Arctic-its "minute
rate of decomposition" and its "relatively low restorative capacity."' 86 In other words, Canada felt its action was "necessary for the
effective prevention of pollution which could cause damage or injury
to the land 87
or marine environment under its exclusive or sovereign
'1
authority.'

Denmark
In 1972, the Danish Ministry of Pollution Control issued a Notice
prohibiting dumping of certain materials from ships. 188 It provides in
relevant part:
Article 1.

1. It shall be unlawful to dump in the seas from Danish ships any
materials loaded on board with a view to dumping, which contain
substances that could have harmful effects on marine animal or plant
life. The prohibition shall, in particular, apply to dumping of
(1) Persistent organic halogen compounds and
(2) Compounds of toxic metals.
2. It shall also be unlawful to dump from Danish ships any materials that could cause serious inconvenience to navigation and
fisheries and other lawful uses of the sea.189

Finland
In 1965, Finland passed a law containing the following provisions:
Article 1.
The discharge or disposal in the sea of residue or other substances
from the territory of Finland or from a Finnish ship shall be pro-

185. Id. § 6(1)(b).

186. Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The
CanadianView, 3 J. MAR.L. & CoM. 1, 4 (1972).
187. Canadian Working Paper on Preservation of the Marine Environment,
U.N. Doc, A/AC./138/SCIII/L. 26 (1972).
188. Notice of Jan. 18, 1972, Prohibiting the Dumping of Certain Materials
from Ships, reprintedin NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE
LAW OF THE SEA 117 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue, 1973), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/16/Add. 2. See also Act No. 285 of June 7, 1972, prohibiting
marine pollution by land-based exploitation of stone, gravel and other natural
deposits in the ground in the territorial seas. Id. at 210-11.

189. Notice of Jan. 18, 1972, Prohibiting the Dumping of Certain Materials
from Ships, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE

LAW OF THE SEA 117 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue, 1973), U.N. Doc.
STILEG/SER.B/16/Add. 2.

hibited, if such action either directly or after its effects have spread,
causes harmful pollution on the high seas.... The same rule shall
apply to mining and other activities of the same nature in the territory
of Finland ....
Article 2.
Discharge in the sea of untreated radiated nuclear fuel and of
radioactive waste developed in connection with the first phase of the
chemical separation of its nuclear fission products shall be prohibited.
Article 3.
Discharge of radioactive materials, other than those referred to in
Article 2, from the territory of Finland or from Finnish ships, in a way
which can harm the human beings, the environment or the living
resources of the sea or expose them to danger, is prohibited. 90
Japan
The Japanese in 1970 passed the Marine Pollution Prevention Law
which provides:
Article 2.
Every person shall endeavour oneself not to pollute the ocean by
the discharge of oil or wastes and by other acts. 191
The Netherlands

The Dutch Pollution of Surface Water Act of 1969192 provides:
1. The depositing of waste, pollutants or harmful substances in whatsoever form without a permit in surface water [including areas of the
open sea designated by the 1Government]
by means of installations for
9
that purpose is prohibited. '
Norway
The Norwegian Government in 1971 issued regulations containing
the following section:
Section 1. In accordance with the prohibition of water pollution...
[set out in the Water Pollution Law of June 26, 1970] Norwegian ships
shall be prohibited from discharging the following substances in international waters, provided that such substances were taken on board
for the purpose of being discharged:
(1). Persistent organic substances, i.e. organic compounds which
can only be broken down slowly in organisms or by natural chemical
processes.
190. Law No. 146, Concerning the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea, Mar. 5,
1965.
191. Law No. 136 of 1970, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES
RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 126 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue,
1973), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16/Add. 2.

192. Reprinted in NATIONAL

LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW

OF THE SEA 66 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16.
193. Pollution of Surface Water Act, ch. I, § 1(1), Nov. 13, 1969, reprinted in
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 66

Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B./16.

(U.N.
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(2). Waste which is composed of the above mentioned substances

or of organic or inorganic compounds of heavy metals or other toxic
metals.
Similarly Norwegian nationals and companies shall be prohibited
194
from taking action with the object of causing such discharge.
Oman
Oman's Marine Pollution Control Law of 1974195 imposes an absolute liability standard and makes subject to fine violation of the

following provision:
Article 2
(1)(a). It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant
into the pollution-free zone [extending 38 miles seaward of the outerlimits of the territorial sea]
from a vessel, a place on land, or an oil
transmission apparatus. 196
Spain
On May 27, 1967, the Council of Ministers issued an order laying
down rules prohibiting the discharge into the sea of petroleum products, which provides in relevant part:
Article 1. Factories and industries of all kinds are hereby prohibited
from discharging into the sea petroliferous products or residues
containing petroliferous substances, whether persistent ... or nonpersistent [without a permit]. 19
Sweden
Sweden's Dumping Act of December 1971198 contains the following
Article:
Article 1.
Waste matter, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, may not be discharged (dumped)... by a Swedish vessel or aircraft in the open sea.
Waste matter intended to be discharged in the open sea may not be
taken out of the country [without a permit. 199
194. Regulations Concerning the Discharge or Dumping of Certain Substances Having Harmful Effect on Marine Life or Human Health, June 11, 1971.
195. Reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW
OF THE SEA 51 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue, 1975), U.N. Doc.

ST/LEG/SER.B/18/Add. 2.
196. Id. at 53.

197. Reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW
OF THE SEA 182 (U.N. Legislative Series 1972), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16.
198. Reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW
OF THE SEA 26 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue, 1974), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/18/Add 2.
199. Id.

United Kingdom
In 1974 the United Kingdom placed the following restrictions on
dumping of land-based waste on the high seas:
Article 1
(1). [N]o person, except in pursuance of a license granted...
(b) shall dump substances or articles in the sea outside United
Kingdom waters from a British ship, aircraft, hovercraft or marine
structure; or
(c) shall load substances or articles on to a ship, aircraft, hovercraft or marine structure in the United Kingdom or United Kingdom
waters for dumping in the sea, whether in United Kingdom waters or
not ....

200

United States
Among the laws and promulgated regulations concerning pollution
of the high seas in the United States are the following provisions:
The President shall undertake to enter into international agreements
to apply uniform standards of performance for the control of the
discharge and emission of pollutants from new sources, uniform
controls over the discharge and emission of toxic pollutants, and uniform controls over the discharge of pollutants into the ocean. For this
purpose the President shall negotiate multilateral treaties, conventions, resolutions, or other agreements, and formulate, present, or
support proposals
at the United Nations and other appropriate inter20
national forums. 1
No permit shall be issued for any discharge to ... the waters of the
contiguous zone, or the oceans, prior to the promulgation of guidelines
under section 403(c) of the [Federal Water Pollution Control] Act unless the Regional Administrator [of the Environmental
Protection
202
Agency] determines it to be in the public interest.
Except as may be authorized by a permit...
(1) no person shall transport from the United States, and
(2) in the case of a vessel or aircraft registered in the United
States or flying the United States flag or in the case of a United
States department, agency, or instrumentality, no person shall
transport from any location
03
any material for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters.

Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics
The Government of the Soviet Union has decreed with regard to
high seas pollution as follows:
200. Dumping at Sea Act 1974, ch. 20, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION
73 (U.N. Legislative Series 1975),
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18/Add. 2.
201. Water Pollution Prevention and Control, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §7, 86 Stat.
896 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1251 (Supp. V 1975)).
202. Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13528, 13533 (1973).
203. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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In order to intensify action to counter pollution of the ...high seas by
substances harmful to human health or to the living resources of the
sea, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR hereby decrees
that: [p]ollution of the ... high seas as a result of the discharge from
Soviet ships or other floating structures, or as a result of failure to
take the requisite steps to prevent the escape therefrom, of the
aforementioned substances or mixtures in violation of international
agreements to which the USSR is a party, shall be punishable by
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or by correctional labour for a term of not more than one year or by a fine of not more
than 10,000 roubles.
Where such acts cause substantial harm to human health or to the
living resources of the sea, they shall be punishable by imprisonment
for a term of not more
2°4 than five years, or by a fine of not more than
...20,000 roubles.
2
ILA Draft Articles on Marine Pollution of Continental Origin

5

The recent work of the International Law Association's (ILA)
Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers20 6 represents the primary effort thus far by publicists to deal directly with
land-based pollution of the high seas. Naturally, the work of publicists cannot constitute State practice, but "the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists" are, like judicial decisions, referred
to by Article 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ "as [a] subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law."20 7 At the very least this
means the work of publicits may evidence the existence of customary
international law.
In accordance with its task of codification and study of certain
selected aspects of water resources law, the Committee- in 1972 presented to the New York Conference of the ILA a report containing,
inter alia, a set of six proposed rules entitled "Draft Articles on
Marine Pollution of Continental Origin," which was subsequently
adopted by the Conference. 0 8 The report noted that marine pollution
204. Reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW

OF THE SEA 72 (U.N. Legislative Series, preliminary issue, 1975), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/18/Add. 2.
205. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIrry-FFTH CONFERENCE 97-106 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ILA]. These Draft Articles are an adapta-

tion of the well-known Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers, note 36 supra,which were adopted by the ILA in 1966 at its 52d Conference. The Committee began exploring the topic of marine pollution of continental origin in 1968.
206. The Committee is composed of approximately 36 members from some 20
countries.
207. Statute of the Court, art. 38(1)(d), reprintedin DocUMENTS ON THE INTER-

NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 60, 77 (S.Rosenne ed. 1974).
208. ILA, supra note 205, at 97.

originates, inter alia, 0from
land-based sources and that rules are
29
needed for its control.
While the work of a private scholarly organization such as the ILA
may not be as authoritative as the work of a public body such as the
International Law Commission, whose members are selected by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, the General Assembly has
nevertheless noted the special worth of recent studies such as the
Draft Articles: "It was agreed in the Sixth Committee that intergovernmental .". . studies. . . , especially those which are of a recent
date, should be taken into account by the International Law
Commission. ' 210 It was the intention of the ILA Water Resources
Committee to issue the Draft Articles in order to "make precise the
relevant basic rules of international law."' 211 In fact, the Draft Articles are, in large part, an extension of the ILA's Helsinki Rules, which,
as was seen earlier, have had a significant influence in the evolution
21 2
of customary international law with regard to international rivers.
Draft Articles I and II on Marine Pollution of Continental Origin
confirm the application of the general principle of sic utere tuo to
land-based pollution of the high seas:
Article I.
As used in this chapter "Continental sea-water pollution" means
any detrimental change in the natural composition, content or quality
of sea water resulting from human conduct taking place within the
limits of the national jurisdiction of a State.
This conduct shall include, inter alia, the discharge or introduction of substances directly into the sea from pipelines, extended outlets, or ships, or indirectly through rivers or other watercourses
whether natural or artificial, or through atmospheric fall-out.
Article II.
Taking into account all relevant factors referred to in Article III, a
State
(a) shall prevent any new form of continental sea-water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing continental seawater pollution which would cause substantial injury in the
territory of another State or to any of its rights under international law or to the marine environment, and
(b) shall take all reasonable measures to abate existing continental sea-water pollution to such an extent that no substantial
injury of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) is caused.2 13
209. Id.
210. Id. at 42-43.
211. Id. at 98.
212. See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra. The ILA also adopts the
commentary to the Helsinki Rules where the text of the Draft Articles corresponds mutatis mutandis with the Helsinki Rules. ILA, supra note 205, at 98.
213. ILA, supra note 205, at 98-99, 100-01. The reference to the "relevant
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These two Draft Articles, while not limited in scope to high seas

pollution only, nevertheless sum up neatly the foregoing evidence of
14
customary international law on land-based high seas pollution.

Draft Article I incorporates the definitional distinction between
the legitimate disposal of land-based waste and pollution, the latter
being waste introduced by man which causes a "detrimental change"

in the marine environment. 215 It further confirms that dumping from
ships, discharges from rivers, the coast and the atmosphere are

sources of land-based high seas pollution.
Article II confirms in unequivocal terms the existence of a general
obligation on the part of States not to pollute the high seas. 216 In
section (a) States must prevent all future pollution, including any
increase in present levels of existing pollution, which causes substantial injury,217 inter alia, to any State rights under international law

(which includes rights inherent in the concept of freedom of the high
seas such as fishing or navigation) and to the marine environment
(recognizing that sea-water constitutes a "sort of global resource...

[which] must be protected in the interests of all12 18). The only difference in treatment between preventing future pollution and abating
existing pollution is in the words of section (b), "all reasonable
measures," by which the ILA Committee "took into account that it is

in general much more complicated to cope effectively with existing
than with future pollution.

2 19

factors" in Article III concerns the establishment of international standards and
interim criteria.
214. The ILA makes clear that the definition of "continental sea-water pollution" includes certain ocean-based activities as well, notably pollution
originating in the territorial sea and the continental shelf. ILA, supra note 205,
at 100.
215. The use of "detrimental change" corresponds to the use of "deleterious
effect" in the more frequently used definition of marine pollution.
216. The ILA, supra note 205, at 101, stresses that the use of the word "shall"
in place of the less obligatory term "should" (cf. Article X of the Helsinki Rules,
which employs the less obligatory term "should," reprinted in note 38 supra)
was to effect the drafters' intention to "make it an obligationto take measures
to stop fouling sea-water." ILA, supra note 205, at 101. It should also be observed
that Article II, which is an adaptation of Article X of the Helsinki Rules, abandons the concept of equitable utilization because the Committee was uncertain
"whether States might claim an 'equitable share' of the beneficial uses of
maritime waters... outside the limits of national jurisdiction of another State."
See ILA, supra note 205, at 102-03, and text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
217. The commentary to Article X of the Helsinki Rules, from which Article II
was borrowed, defines an injury as "substantial" if it "materially interferes with
or prevents a reasonable use of the water." Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, art. X
comment (c), at 500.
218. ILA, supra note 205, at 101.
219. Id.

Concerning standards of State responsibility, the commentary to
Article X of the Helsinki Rules suggests that a State is responsible -for
land-based pollution causing substantial injury to the high seas,
"whether the pollution results from public activity of the State itself,
within or outside its territory, or from conduct of private parties
within its territory."22 0 Further, Draft Article V on marine pollution
provides:
Article V.
In the case of violation of the rules in Article II [prevention of new,
and abatement of existing land-based pollution causing or likely to
cause substantial injury], the State responsible shall cease the wrongful conduct and shall compensate
the injured State for the injury that
1
has been caused to it.=

Thus, the drafters make no distinction in the standard of responsibility for violation of the duty either to prevent new pollution or to
abate existing pollution. Further, Draft Articles II and V taken to222
gether appear to suggest a strict standard of State responsibility.
The comments to Draft Article V make clear that the drafters envisage the possibility that both States and non-States-such as international environmental organizations-could demand the cessation of
polluting activities.223 However, the drafters reached "no conclusion
• . . on the question whether compensation will be due-and to

whom-in cases where pollution has caused substantial injuries to
the marine environment-at-large or whether in such cases 224
it suffices
to claim that the wrongful conduct is brought to an end."
CONCLUSION

The introduction of land-based waste to the high seas is, in general,
a necessary and legitimate consequence of human activity unless it
"pollutes" the marine environment. To qualify as pollution, landbased waste reaching the high seas through rivers, coastal discharges, the atmosphere, ocean currents, or by dumping must be
shown to result in real or potential material damage. Only in such a
case does general customary international law by application of the
generial principle sic utere tuo operate to prohibit land-based pollution of the high seas. The application of sic utere tuo to land-based
high seas pollution is consistent with its accepted application to
analogous areas of international law, notably pollution of international rivers, air pollution, hostile expeditions and pollution of outer
space. Evidence of the obligation not to pollute the high seas from
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, art. X comment (d), at 500.
ILA, supra note 205, at 104.
See also Helsinki Rules, supra note 36, art. XI comments, at 502.
ILA, supra note 205, at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
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land-based sources is to be found in the protests of States, bilateral
and multilateral treaties, judicial decisions, the activities of the
United Nations (particularly the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, United Nations Resolutions and the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), declarations of regional
organizations, and a growing body of municipal legislation as well as
in the work of the ILA.
Concerning the question of liability for the violation of the customary international law obligation not to pollute, there is a growing
tendency to suggest a strict standard of liability in accordance with
the objective theory of State responsibility under which States are
responsible without regard to fault for injuries resulting from all
land-based high seas pollution introduced by private individuals as
well as State instrumentalities.
It must be recognized, however, that the international community
has made only an initial foray toward resolution of the ambiguities
inherent in the concepts of freedom of the high seas and the control of
land-based pollution. A vague definition of injury, a broad customary international law norm prohibiting pollution, and an uncertain
standard for State responsibility at best leave many important and
difficult legal questions unanswered as grist for the international
lawyer's mill.
Finally, it should be stressed that international law is but one
element in the pollution-control equation. Science, technology,
economics and politics all will play a significant if not decisive role in
determining to what extent States will practice conservation by
controlling their land-based pollution of the high seas.

